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ABSTRACT

This study analyzes empirically the relationship between no-fault
divorce legislation and the divorce rates of American states. No-fault
legislation is defined to include recent (post-1969) statutes based on
the principle of marital breakdown as well as separation grounds for
divorce where the requisite period of separation is one year or less.
Divorce rates are measured by an index designed to reflect both the mag
nitude of the rate and the amount of change in the rate during the pe
riod 1960-1978. A cross-sectional research design is used involving
correlation and regression analysis.
It was hypothesized that the pres
ence of no-fault divorce law in a state contributes to an increase in
the divorce rate of that state. Additional hypotheses were presented
relating each of the additional independent variables to the state di
vorce rate.
The major hypothesis was not supported. ’ Results indicate that the
type of divorce law present in a state does not influence the state’s
divorce rate. This finding supports previous research on the impact of
no-fault legislation on divorce rates. Four other hypotheses were ac
cepted. Migration, unemployment, and age distribution were shown to be
positively related to divorce rates; Catholicism was negatively related
to divorce rates.
Additional analysis was undertaken in which the divorce law was
viewed as the dependent variable and the.,divorce rate as an independent
variable. A weak relationship was found, suggesting that no-fault di
vorce legislation might be a response to increasing divorce rates
rather than a potential catalyst for further increase in the rates.
Further empirical research is needed to examine this possibility more
fully.
A conceptual framework based on exchange theory and field theory
is presented to predict and explain the relationship between divorce
law and divorce behavior. Divorce laws are identified as a social bar
rier to divorce. Utilizing a problems perspective, in which divorce is
characterized as a social problem, the relationship between divorce
laws and divorce rates is discussed in terms of social control and sys
tem stability. Concepts of societal scale and organic solidarity are
used throughout to account for the role of social change in understand
ing the institutions of the law and the family in modern society. Some
of the functional aspects of divorce and of no-fault divorce legisla
tion are discussed in the concluding chapter.

NO-FAULT DIVORCE LEGISLATION
AND ITS IMPACT ON STATE DIVORCE RATES

INTRODUCTION

The study of divorce relates to broader issues of system stability
and social control.

The family in America has been viewed historically

as the backbone (Andrew, 1978) or foundation (0*Neill, 1967) of society.
As modern society becomes increasingly interdependent the family is un
dergoing a period of transition (Skolnick, 1973:67) with many of its
functions, such as education and provision of certain essential goods
and services, now being performed by extra-familial institution and
agencies.

The focus of the family has shifted toward provision of cru

cial primary group support for family members (Parsons, in Skolnick,
1973:113, 431).

As structural differentiation continues among and

within societal institutions the relative importance of each of the in
stitutions for the smooth functioning of the social system increases.
Threats to any one of the institutions will have implications for the
general social order.

Although the "family as foundation" argument is

challenged today, the family continues to be recognized as a basic so
cietal institution and consequently family stability remains an essen
tial element of overall system stability.
Today, as in the past, divorce is considered a social problem be
cause it is perceived to threaten the stability of family life.

Both

formal and informal means of social control are employed to regulate
the divorce problem and protect the integrity of the family.

Divorce

laws are the formalized means of social control of the problem.
2

Since
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no-fault divorce legislation represents a major shift in the traditional
philosophy regarding the dissolution of marriage and its control, this
change has been accompanied by considerable controversy.

One recurrent

issue has been the potential effect of the new laws on the steadily ris
ing rate of divorce.
The purpose of this thesis is to examine empirically this relation
ship between no-fault divorce legislation and divorce rates in the
United States to determine the independent impact of the law on the
state rates.

It is recognized that divorce is a complex issue with

many legal aspects, including matters of child custody, property divi
sion and maintenance (alimony).

Consideration of the impact of no-fault

legislation on all of these factors is beyond the scope of this paper.
For this reason the focus of attention is limited to changes in the
bases for marital dissolution (grounds for divorce) in the new and the
traditional laws.

It is also recognized that marriages can terminate

through death of one spouse and through annulment as well as by divorce;
and that marital relations can be severed through desertion and separa
tion.

The focus here, however, is on absolute divorce, and the terms

marriage termination and dissolution are used synonymously with divorce
unless otherwise stated.
Chapter one provides an historical perspective of divorce law re
form in the United States and illustrates why no-fault divorce repre
sents a significant change in fundamental attitudes toward divorce.
Chapter two discusses the concept of no-fault as it is applied currently
and several of the factors relevant to its development.

In chapter

three a conceptual framework based on exchange theory and field theory
is presented which offers one interpretation of the relationship between

divorce law and divorce behavior.

Previous empirical research on trad

tional and no-fault laws is reported in chapter four.

The research de

sign and methods used in this study are explained in chapter five.
Chapter six presents and discusses the findings of the empirical anal
ysis, and implications of the research are discussed, in chapter seven.

CHAPTER ONE
HISTORY OF DIVORCE REFORM

Church versus State

Divorce reform in America began with the English colonists.

As set

tlers in a new land they brought with them a body of well-established
divorce procedures as sanctioned and implemented by the Church of England.
However, separation of Church and State was a fundamental issue for many
who came to America and was quickly achieved in matters relating to mar
riage .
In England, as elsewhere in the Western world, marriage had been un
der complete Church control since the thirteenth century A.D. (Lichtenberger, 1931:79).
valid.

Only ceremonies performed by church officials were

The bond they created between two persons was considered sacred

and indissoluble.

Divorce was not permitted; consequently there were no

grounds for marital dissolution.

The Church did provide alternatives to

a failed marriage, however, recognizing the sinful nature of man even
within the sacred institution of marriage.

In certain cases an annulment

could be obtained which declared the marriage invalid from the outset and
freed such individuals to marry other persons if they so chose.

Impo-

tency, disparity of worship, defect of consent and consanguinity were
among causes deemed sufficient to declare a marriage null and void (Lichtenberger, 1931:90).

Under other circumstances, many of which later

formed the basis for legal grounds for absolute divorce (e.g. adultery,

5
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insanity), a form of legal separation known as divorce from bed and
board (divortium

a

mensa et thoro) resulted in spouses living separate

and apart but being unable to marry again because the marital bond be
tween them remained intact.

On rare occasion a very wealthy and influ

ential individual received a divorce by private act obtainable only from
Parliament or the King.

Records indicate that between 1800 and 1836

there was an average of three such divorces granted per year (Friedman,
1973:181).

With this exception divorce was unavailable under ecclesi

astical law.

England was, legally speaking, a divorceless society.

In

the absence of legal recourse, desertion and adultery were frequent ac
companiments of marital breakdown.
This ecclesiastical stronghold was broken from the outset in some
of the Northern colonies.

Ideologically their sentiments ran parallel

to those expressed by Luther during the Protestant Reformation.

De

claring marriage to be a normal human institution he repudiated "the
sacramental character of marriage as a priestly invention and the ex
clusive control of the Church as an unwarranted usurpation" (Lichtenberger, 1931:92).

Unlike Luther the colonists were successful in trans

lating their beliefs into action and in some areas authority was transfered out of the hands of the Church and into secular channels.

Civil

contract theory which dominated attitudes toward marriage and divorce
prior to the early centuries of the Christian era was once again at the
forefront in the colonies.
Following the American Revolution and the end to English domination
most of the states, including those in the South, claimed and exercised
a legislative prerogative to grant divorce by private act (Rheinstein,
1972:33).

At this point authority had passed out of the hands of the

Church and into the state legislatures.

In most cases, however, divorce

remained available only by private act (special permission) of the gov
erning body.

Gradually the states undertook further reform measures as

the number of divorces increased and the legislative process came under
attack as being cumbersome, arbitrary, costly and lacking in procedural
safeguards (Rheinstein, 1972:34).

Based partially on the already oper

ative New England model, virtually all the states enacted legislation
granting jurisdiction to the civil courts and enumerating specific al
lowable grounds for divorce, thus creating a legal matter out of a moral
issue.

One notable exception was the state of South Carolina where the

introduction of divorce laws was expressly forbidden by the state con
stitution (Rheinstein, 1972:53).

The other states varied in the laxity

of their laws, from New York where adultery became the sole ground, to
states having a variety of recognized causes for divorce.

These grounds

continued to change from time to time through legislative reform.

With

in states and across states additional grounds were added, existing
grounds were deleted, or both.

The Constitutional Amendment

During the 1800s divorce increased sufficiently in this country to
stimulate growing alarm among those who perceived this trend as a har
binger of the demise of the family.

By the 1890s serious efforts were

underway to reduce this threat to the stability of family life.

It had

long been accepted that protection of the public good and general wel
fare required governmental oversight in certain areas, including the
production, caretaking, socialization and education of children.

As

the divorce rate continued to increase during the nineteenth century
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many moral conservatives began to question whether the state was the
proper level of government in which to vest the power to regulate di
vorce.

Many of them preferred placing authority in the Federal govern

ment to insure uniform application of laws throughout the nation.

The

country was faced once again with the issue of jurisdiction and a second
major reform movement was underway.

The goal of these moralists was to

transfer power from the various state legislatures to the Congress in
an effort to secure greater control over the divorce laws and thus turn
back the tide of the rising divorce rate.
Achievement of the goal would first require an amendment to the
Constitution giving Congress the right to act in matters of divorce.

As

written, the Constitution relinquished authority to the states in all
matters not expressly reserved to the Congress.

Opponents of the amend

ment argued in favor of statesT rights and the desirability of local
control in deciding on appropriate divorce legislation.

Those in favor

supported uniformity throughout the country in order to eliminate prob
lems associated with a mobile population, including migratory divorce
and certain aspects of common law marriages.

In 1926, following three

decades of reform efforts the following comment was published (reported
in Lichtenberger, 1931:203-204):
. . . The contract of marriage should be a matter
of interstate commity and commerce as much as con
tract for the sale of commodities, or freight
rates, or the white slave traffic. Citizens of
the United States when moving from State to State
take their civil rights with them. A married pair
should be able to take their civil status in one
State to any other State, especially when that
status establishes their position as upright citi
zens instead of bigamists, or adulterers, and
clothes their children with legitimacy or illegit
imacy . . . But this is not true in the United
States, and a married pair may find themselves
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violators when they leave the situs of their
marriage and travel to another State which
does not recognize their marriage, or their
divorce, or their remarriage.
The Supreme Court had already ruled in Haddock v. Haddock that the Full
Faith and Credit clause of the Constitution, which might offer protec
tion in such cases, did not apply in questions of marriage and divorce
(Lichtenberger, 1931:204).

Thus, the only chance for uniformity was an

amendment.
Much of the debate centered around religio-moral issues and the
battle was a long one in which both sides faced organizational inade
quacies and ideological divisiveness.

During the period 1884-1947 some

form of Federal amendment on marriage and divorce laws was introduced
at every new Congress (Rheinstein, 1972:46).

Only one ever reached com

mittee discussion and none was ever brought to a vote.

The attempt to

pass a Constitutional amendment was generally ineffective and never
posed a serious threat to state sovereignty.

States retained jurisdic

tion as the proper authority to legislate divorce within their respec
tive boundaries.

The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act

Efforts to achieve uniformity were not limited to efforts aimed to
ward passage of a Constitutional amendment.

In 1892 the National Con

ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) was estab
lished.

Its purpose was to propose model legislation on different le

gal matters for consideration by the various states in hopes of obtain
ing full support for the bills nationally.

Ideally each of the states

would agree with the position taken in the bill and voluntarily adopt

10

it, thus producing national uniformity on issues not subject to Federal
control.

Marriage and divorce was one area in which model legislation

was drafted.
This avenue also failed to lead to the desired uniformity in di
vorce laws and did not further the goals of the reformers at the turn
of the century.

A total of seven statutes on marriage and divorce were

drafted by 1916 but only a few of the states had enacted any of them
(O’Neill, 1967:240).

The commissioners eventually turned their atten

tion to other matters.

In this perspective the National Conference of

Commissioners was not influential in the uniformity reform movement.
Several decades later, however, it figured largely in the debate of an
other major reform effort.
In 1970 the NCCUSL passed a Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA).
Agreement had been a long time coming as the Commissioners and members
of the Family Law Section of the American Bar Association failed to
agree on the crucial matter of grounds for divorce.

Although the Uni

form Marriage and Divorce Act was a thirty-five page document the ABA
refused to endorse it largely because of the controversial no-fault pro
visions for obtaining a divorce.

They stated support of no-fault di

vorce in principle but did not accept the specifics of the Act (Wheeler,
1974:126).

Historically the NCCUSL and its bills received much of their

prestige from the backing of the ABA so it was anxious to obtain the en
dorsement to help encourage states to adopt the Act.

The UMDA was ul

timately approved by the NCCUSL and subsequently served as a basis for
legislation in several states.

It did not succeed in being adopted by

all or even most states but it did come at a crucial time in the
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movement toward no-faul€ divorce and provided a framework for states in
terested in revising their traditional fault-based laws.
The history of reform continues today as states confront the issue
of grounds for divorce and respond to recent attempts to remove the con
cept of fault from the divorce procedure.

Attention is presently fo

cused on reform that is designed to change fundamental attitudes toward
divorce and divorcing persons.

This is a significant and rapidly devel

oping change and represents for our country a new direction in divorce
laws.

CHAPTER TWO
THE CONCEPT AND DEFINITION OF NO-FAULT DIVORCE

Definition

In 1969 the state of California passed no-fault divorce legislation
as part of its comprehensive Family Law Act, effectively doing away with
the divorce process in that state and replacing it with a procedure for
the dissolution of marriage.
mantics.

The change was more than a matter of se

It represented a new concept in marriage termination and set a

precedent for the adoption of similar legislation by other states.

Dur

ing the decade that followed approximately two-thirds of the state leg
islatures enacted some form of the new no-fault divorce law (see Appendix A).

Fifteen states followed California's lead and abolished exist

ing grounds for divorce and substituted a single no-fault provision.
Another fifteen states added a no-fault provision to their existing
grounds.

Other states maintained that existing grounds for divorce,

such as separation and incompatibility, already provided similar options
and they declined to add the no-fault procedure.

Only three states re

main where it is not possible to end a marriage without first proving
that one's spouse is guilty of marital misconduct.

Reform efforts con

tinue in states which have not adopted no-fault divorce procedures and
the trend is in the direction favorable to proponents of the new laws.
No-fault divorce laws provide for the dissolution of a marriage
upon a finding by the court that the marriage has broken down to the
12
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extent that any reconciliation is unlikely.
eliminated.

The premise of fault is

It is not necessary to show evidence of marital misconduct.

The focus of the inquiry is the condition of the marriage relationship
rather than the acts and characteristics of the partners involved (Ham
ilton, 1978:7).

Either spouse may file for dissolution using the neu

tral format "In re the marriage of John and Mary Doe" rather than the
familiar "John Doe versus Mary Doe."

If it is determined that the mar

riage is not viable, regardless of reason, it is dissolved.

Generally

the courts accept as conclusive evidence of marital breakdown the state
ment of one or both of the spouses that the marriage has failed.

In

some states counseling and/or an interim period before actual dissolu
tion may be required or may be recommended at the discretion of the
court.

The no-fault divorce procedure is a dramatic change from the

traditional adversary approach in which an "innocent" spouse is granted
a divorce from the "guilty" spouse upon proof of marital wrongdoing.
Prior to the no-fault laws mutual desire and consent were not legiti
mate grounds for divorce (Kirkpatrick, 1955:539).
The definition of no-fault divorce is not clear-cut and there is
some discrepancy in the use of the term.

Clearly the recent reform leg

islation designed specifically to be fault-free in nature is included in
this category.

A review of the state statutes by Harper Hamilton in

cluded the following legal terminology for conditions existing in the
marital relationship which are considered bases for no-fault divorce in
the various states:

(1) irreconcilable differences, (2) upon finding

that the marriage relationship is no longer viable, (3) irremedial
breakdown, and (4) unsupportable because of discord or conflict of per
sonalities that destroys the legitimate ends of the marriage relationship

14

and prevents a reasonable expectation of reconciliation (Hamilton, 1978:
5).

These phrases are used interchangeably in discussion and all refer

to sufficient cause for divorce according to the recently developed no
fault concept.

Two other grounds for divorce are also considered to be

fault-free by many researchers and other individuals.

They are incom

patibility and separation, but there are certain aspects about these two
grounds which lead others to exclude them from the no-fault group.
The first incompatibility statutes were adopted a century ago (Sell,
1979:297).

They were later replaced by similar statutes which, through

court interpretation, were declared to be fault-free in theory.
ever, the problem of implementation remained.

How

Incompatibility was asso

ciated with the traditional fault system and tended to be regarded in
that perspective (Sell, 1979:298; Wheeler, 1974:38; Wright and Stetson,
1978:576).

It exists as a ground for divorce along with other fault

grounds in New Mexico (adopted in 1933), Alaska (1935), Oklahoma (1953)
*
and Kansas (1969) (Sell, 1979:298).

Wheeler states, "For the most part

courts [in New Mexico, Alaska and Oklahoma] have interpreted the term
strictly, refusing divorce where a husband and wife simply do not get
along with each other and have required that incompatibility be proven
with evidence which could just as well support a finding of cruelty."
(Wheeler, 1974:38).

Although technically not based on fault these in

compatibility statutes in practice do not reflect the spirit of recent
reform and are therefore excluded from the no-fault category in this
discussion.
Separation as a ground for divorce raises related questions.

It

has also been on the books in numerous states for many years and sev
eral changes have occurred since the first statutes were passed as

15

early as 1839 (Sell, 197*9:299).

The trend has been toward reducing the

number of years of separation required before it may be used as grounds
for divorce.

Periods of ten, seven or five years are changed, sometimes

in several stages, to shorter periods of five, three or one years.

Re

search by Sell indicates that the length of separation required by a
state is a factor in the extent to which separation is used as a ground
for divorce (Sell, 1979:300).

In general, the shorter the separation

period the greater the likelihood separation will be used.

Statistical

evidence leads Sell to conclude that the one year mark is a dividing
line in the "use" pattern of separation (Sell, 1979:300).

Currently

there are twelve states which have separation grounds as the only alter
native to traditional fault grounds.

(Eight others have separation in

addition to both fault and no-fault grounds.)

Six of the states require

a period greater than one year, ranging from eighteen months in New Jer
sey to three years in Arkansas, Utah and South Carolina.

The remaining

six states require a period of one year, with Vermont requiring only
six months separation.

All but one in the latter group of states short

ened the length of time required by existing statutes sometime after
1970.

The one exception, North Carolina, had a one year requirement as

early as 1965.

The other states either have not shortened the separa

tion time in recent years or have added separation as a new statute but
require a separation longer than one year.

Based on these facts and

time factors those six states having separation of one year or less as
grounds for divorce are included in the no-fault category for the pur
poses of this research.

These statutes offer the opportunity to dis

solve a marriage without fault-finding procedures and without prolonged
periods of waiting before the legal rights of divorce and remarriage
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may be exercised.

In this manner they "act like" the no-fault laws

based on breakdown and not like their sister statutes in other states.
The six remaining states are not considered no-fault states.
The issue of what constitutes no-fault divorce is not easily re
solved.

Researchers disagree.

Authors disagree.

Zuckman (1975) has

recommended separate terminology to distinguish the laws;

He suggests

that "no-fault" be reserved for the "particular scheme of recent legis
lation in a handful of states which completely eliminates all fault
grounds from collateral proceedings of alimony, child support, property
division, and to a large extent, child custody."

The term "non-fault"

would apply to divorce under "any existing legislation which provides
at least one ground for divorce which doesn’t require showing a marital
misconduct on the part of the respondent spouse." (Zuckman, 1975:6).
Whatever the terminology it is important to understand that there are
differences in the no-fault laws from state to state and that the definition of no-fault and fault divorce may vary from situation to situa
tion.
Other labels have been applied to no-fault divorce reflecting the
way in which the laws work.

The labels include "no-grounds divorce"

(Wheeler, 1974), "divorce on demand" (Andrew, 1978), and "unilateral
divorce" (Krause, 1977).

They are applied because legal options often

available to the court in its decision-making process, such as investi
gations into the state of the marriage, mandatory counseling, and/or
family court services, are rarely undertaken even where permissible.
Glendon notes that these are largely matters of formality and ritual,
originally included in the no-fault legislation to insure passage, and
later frequently repealed.

She describes the process this way:

"But
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now the principle of breakdown has been accepted, the palliatives of in
quest or conciliation necessary to secure passage of no-fault legisla
tion can be seen to be dropping away through repeal or disuse." (Glendon,
1977:235).

At the same time fault-based defenses against divorce such as

recrimination, connivance, and condonation have been limited so that they
are both inappropriate and inadmissible in fault-free dissolution pro
ceedings.

This leaves the door wide open to "divorce on demand".

One

spouse can terminate his/her marriage at will with the statement that it
has broken down irretrievably.
The situation is the same under most separation statutes.

It is

necessary only to demonstrate proof of separation for the requisite
amount of time and divorce is granted.

Wheeler suggests that this may

be a more radical notion than breakdown statutes because it enables an
individual to dissolve his or her marriage without even a pro forma in
vestigation by the court (Wheeler, 1974:49).

Krause, in an historical

perspective, suggests that we have passed from restrictive divorce
through consent divorce (long available through collusion) to unilateral
divorce (Krause, 1977:274).

After several years on the books it is ap

parent that for all practical purposes no-fault divorce provides in
fact, if not in form, divorce on unilateral demand.
The application of these terms is interesting in view of the fact
that technically the new laws place more authority than ever in the
hands of the judge to deny a divorce request (Glendon, 1977:230).

Under

the fault system divorce had to be granted if the grounds were proved.
Under no-fault laws a judge could conceivably determine that the mar
riage is not in fact irretrievably broken or that the differences are
reconcilable.

Although such action is unlikely it would be within the
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letter of the law.

The ambiguity of the wording in no-fault statutes

is frequently attacked for this reason.

According to Glendon one excep

tion is the state of Washington where the Marriage Dissolution Act of
1973 states that the court must dissolve marriages if both parties al
lege that the marriage is irretrievably broken or if no denial is en
tered by one party to such allegation by the other.

Colorado is the only

other state where divorce must be granted if a petition for divorce is
unchallenged.

Factors Related to Its Inception

Divorce law reform during the 1970s was in large part a response to
alarm over the steadily rising rate of divorce.

Although the general

trend in the national divorce rate has been upward since statistics were
first collected in 1867, there have been occasional periods of dramatic
increase.

The post-World War II years were one such period.

In 1946

0

the divorce rate hit a record high of 4.3 divorces per thousand popula
tion (Scanzoni and Scanzoni, 1976:457).

The rate subsequently fell and

leveled off at 2.1-2.3 for a number of years.

In 1963 it began another

upward climb which by 1975 had brought the rate up to 4.9 (Statistical
Abstract of the United States, 1979:84).

During that time the rate in

creased annually, with only two exceptions in 1965 and 1966 (Vital Sta
tistics of the United States, 1965, 1970, 1974:2-6).

Within a period

of twelve years the divorce rate more than doubled and reached its high
est level at that point in the nationTs history (see Figure 1, page 19).
Legislative reform was seen as one potential means of dealing with
the problem of this growing incidence of divorce.

Divorce laws as a

mechanism of social control are intended to support the goal of stability
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Figure 1.

United States"Crude Divorce Rate, 1920-1978
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States, National Center for Health Statistics (1978).
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in marriage and family life.

When the goal was not being achieved, as

evidenced in higher divorce rates, the argument was made for changing
the laws.

Lichtenberger labels this approach the legalistic habit of

mind, refering to the ” . . . almost universal reliance upon law to cre
ate or maintain the approved standards . . ." (Lichtenberger, 1931:162).
He notes it has been employed at other times in our history when
ing divorce rates led to passage of more stringent marriage
laws.

increas

anddivorce

During the 1960s and 1970s there was support in general for change

but disagreement as to what changes should be made as demonstrated in the
variety of new laws which emerged.
no-win situation.

In many aspects it appeared to be a

Borrowing from Bohannon’s list of divorce-related

"trite homilies" the dilemma finds expression:

easy divorce may lead to

casual marriage and the demise of the family; difficult divorce may lead
to unhappy and destructive marriages and the demise of the family (Bohan
non, 1979:318, emphasis added).
At the same time legislation was recognized as one factor possibly
contributing to the problem of the growing incidence of divorce.

After

studying California’s experience With non-adversary divorce three re
searchers noted:
From time to time some of those persons who deal
with social problems tend to look upon legisla
tion as the ultimate tool for social reform . . . .
Reality is seldom so comforting. More often
than not, the laws are part of the problem rather
than part of the solution, a mirror of social
confusions and hypocrises.
(Schoen, Greenblatt,
Mielke, 1975:234)
Arnold Rose (1968) has studied the relationship between law and the
causation of social problems and has identified eleven ways in which
law helps to cause social problems.

Two of these are of particular
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interest to the study of divorce and divorce law:

(1) a social value

was enacted into statute, or it entered into common law, at an earlier
period, and is inappropriate to current expectations for behavior; and
(2) it encourages certain collusions and perjuries to "get around the
law," which are themselves illegal and encourage disrespect for the law
(Rose, 1968, 42-43).

The relevance of these processes to the develop

ment and application of no-fault divorce law is discussed in greater
detail below.
The increasing divorce rate, then, contributed to the focus on di
vorce laws in recent years.

It also underscored potential problems in

herent in the laws themselves.
of ways.

The states reacted to this in a variety

Most chose to reform their divorce laws and some chose to

abolish the old system completely and begin again with new laws.
No-fault divorce legislation was designed in part to correct for
perceived shortcomings in the existing laws.

Two areas of particular

concern were the issues of personal trauma and of system abuse.

Advo

cates argue that the trauma associated with divorce is substantially
lessened by eliminating the need to provide proof of marital wrongdoing
as part of the dissolution process.

The actions of the individuals in

volved are not subject to public scrutiny.

One spouse is not blamed

for the marriage breakdown while the other is exonerated.

The intention

is to provide an efficient, truthful and more dignified avenue for mar
riage termination.

By replacing traditional attitudes of punishment and

guilt associated with divorce and divorcing persons with neutral consid
erations and concern for both spouses, the likelihood of personal bit
terness is lessened.

The threat of divorce or the refusal to sue for

divorce cannot be used by one spouse against another in bargaining for
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child custody and other settlement issues since either spouse has access
to the court.

The less hostile and more civilized atmosphere, as envi

sioned by those who drafted and supported the bills, is also beneficial
to children caught in the divorce process.

It should be noted, however,

that in matters of child custody, as in alimony and property division
decisions, the issue of fault is still alive.

Evidence of misconduct is

admissible in most states in cases where an out-of-court agreement has
not been reached and fault may form the basis for a judgment by the
court regarding these corollary issues (Sell, 1979:296-297).
Problems associated with abuse of the traditional divorce process
are widespread and well-known.

The fault system is attacked as being

hypocritical on the grounds that it not only tolerates perjury and col
lusion but actually encourages such actions (Wheeler, 1974:8).

Couples

who do not have legally acceptable grounds for divorce but who wish to
terminate their marriage frequently fabricate evidence and perjure them
selves in court.

Such action is commonplace and Wheeler states that

most people in the legal profession accept as axiomatic the notion that
perjury is the rule in divorce courts (Wheeler, 1974:5).

The fact that

everyone is involved, including the couples and their lawyers and the
judges, results in a sham in the courtroom and contributes to disrespect
for the legal process.

Timothy Walker discusses this behavior as an ex

ample of law accommodation, a pattern of normative deviation that occurs
when there is a breakdown in the ability of a law or rule to command ad
herence on the basis of its own utility (Walker, 1971:267-268).

The re

sult is behavior "that operates within the established procedures of a
legal system in order to attain the goal provided by the system."

The

system is accommodated but the procedures are compromised in order to
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achieve acceptable results.

This compromise has been recognized by oth

ers including Max Rheinstein (1972) in his analysis of the "dual law of
divorce."

The dichotomy between the law on the books and the law in ac

tion is a familiar one and is indicative of the compromise nature of
many of our laws.

Conservatives are satisfied with the strict nature of

the letter of the divorce law while others adopt a policy of nonenforce
ment to bring the law into line with social reality (Rheinstein, 1972:
254).

There is still a price to be paid (e.g. perjury) but it is pos

sible to circumvent the law.

Increasing and flagrant abuse of the

existing fault system was one of the major factors in no-fault reform
efforts.
Proponents for change also argue that the adversary approach is in
appropriate for divorce proceedings since ninety percent of all faultbased divorce cases are uncontested (Sell, 1979:292; Foster, 1969:113;
Wheeler, 1974:4).

From this view the fault system further complicates

the issue by requiring couples and lawyers to mold the reason for desir
ing a divorce into one of the legal grounds for divorce recognized by
law.

For example, evidence indicates that at least seventy-five percent

of divorces in fault states are based on the ground of cruelty (Wheeler,
1974:4).

Other grounds, more difficult to prove and easier to contest

in the absence of legitimate evidence, are less likely to be utilized.
There are other objections to the traditional system less fre
quently cited in the literature, which also played a part in the move
ment toward no-fault divorce legislation.

The ones discussed above

were perhaps the most pressing in the minds of the reformers.

They

were clearly identified in the Commissioners1 Prefatory Note of 1971 to
the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act:
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The traditional conception based on fault has
been singled out particulary, both as an inef
fective barrier to marriage dissolution which
is regularly overcome by perjury, thus promot
ing disrespect for the law and its process,
and as an unfortunate device which adds to the
bitterness and hostility of divorce proceed
ings.
(quoted in Kargman, 1973:246)
Although no-fault divorce addresses many of the problems associated
with current laws there remains opposition to a wholesale change in the
adversary system.
vorce.

Some favor reform without endorsing no-fault di

Opposition centers on the statutes themselves and on their po

tential impact.
Concern over the wording and definition of no-fault statutes ham
pers reform efforts.

Phrases such as "irreconcilable differences" and

"irremedial breakdown” are attacked as ambiguous.

If taken literally,

no divorce would result since conceivably there might always be some
small possibility of eventual reconciliation (Wheeler, 1974:21).

Beyond

a few written statements intended to clarify the meaning, the court has
great discretion in applying the law.

The fact that few cases have

arisen involving a challenge to the meaning of the statutes does not
preclude continued opposition to this aspect of the law.
Safeguards appear minimal to many conservatives.

The phrases "di

vorce on demand" and "unilateral divorce" cause alarm among such oppo
nents of the no-fault laws.

They argue that such a system violates the

state’s interest in preserving stable marriages since procedurally no
efforts are undertaken to verify breakdown or encourage reconciliation.
The fact that there is no defense available to an unwilling partner in
the dissolution process is another point cited.

Inherent in those con

siderations is a fear that there will be a rush to dissolve a potentially
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viable marriage prematurely, accompanied by an increase in the termina
tion of intact but threatened marriages.

It parallels the "open door"

argument discussed by Kirkpatrick (1955), e.g.:
available, divorce traffic will increase.

where divorce is easily

Opponents are concerned that

the new laws will only increase the divorce rate.
In general the advent of no-fault divorce has been characterized as
an example of the law catching up with reality.

Concepts of marriage

and family life and the mores governing such relationships have changed
and continue to change dramatically during this century.

Changing sex

roles, greater geographic and social mobility, (especially for women),
emphasis on personal freedom and individualism, increasing economic in
dependence of family members, and the influence of pragmatism on atti
tudes toward the permanence of marriage are some of the factors contrib
uting to the more fluid and pragmatic nature of marriage and the family.
Prior to recent reform efforts marriage and divorce legislation did not
correspond with the realities of contemporary marriage, thus the need
for law accommodation.

They were reflective of a time when lasting mar

riages were highly valued and restrictive divorce measures were insti
tuted to punish those who desired to break up a marriage for any reason.
As more opportunities open up outside the marriage relationship, its
permanence becomes increasingly less attractive to some individuals and 7
the security it once provided becomes less crucial.

The result was a

noticeable culture lag in which family law had failed to respond to the
needs of the modern family (Lichtenberger, 1931:6, 259; Bohannon, 1979:
319; Dean and Kargman, 1966:273).

No-fault divorce represents an ef

fort to remedy the lag and bring the legal and social realities of di
vorce into alignment.
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Despite the fundamental legal and ideological changes incorporated
in no-fault divorce it has been surprisingly well received (Wheeler,
1974:30).

A diversity of states with a wide range of social and polit

ical characteristics have accepted the concept partially or _in toto and
have functioning no-fault legislation in place today.

Wheeler notes

that the diversity of states with no-fault indicates that the success
or failure of reform efforts in each state depends in large part on the
potential skill and energy of the people behind it (Wheeler, 1974:153).
For this reason special interest groups may significantly influence a
decision in their favor in one state while exerting little or no pres
sure on legislators in another state.

In California, for example, the

Catholic Church did not object to passage of the Family Law Act while
similar legislation has been hampered in other states by opposition
from the Catholic leaders and lay persons.

In some states, including

California, no-fault laws have passed on the first attempt.

In other

states, Idaho, for example, repeated efforts have failed to pass reform
measures.

These examples illustrate that the experience of each state

will be different from that of other states.

Trend analysis does sug

gest that eventually each state will have some form of no-fault divorce
on its books and in action.^

It is noted here that after this study was completed the re
searcher learned that Pennsylvania has amended its divorce law, adding
irretrievable breakdown to its existing fault grounds (Purdon’s Penn
sylvania Legislative Service, 1980:51). This change, because it is so
recent, would not alter the findings of this study.
It is particularly
significant, however, since Pennsylvania was one of the three states
which had not recognized the principle of no-fault divorce, even by its
most liberal definition, in its laws. The new law became effective
July, 1980.

CHAPTER THREE
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The impact of no-fault divorce legislation on divorce rates can be
more fully understood in the broader context of the relationship between
divorce law and family stability, utilizing divorce rates as a measure
of family stability.

Two theoretical models provide a means for study

ing the relationship between laws and stability.

These models are ex

change theory and field theory, the relevance of both to the study of
divorce having been established in previous research (Lewis and Spanier,
1979; Scanzoni, 1972; Levinger, 1965; Kuo, 1974).

Lewis and Spanier

(1979:285) note that the key concepts of attractions and barriers used
in field theory are compatible with exchange theory.

This basic com

patibility enables one to draw from both bodies of literature, which
will be done here.
In the exchange model divorce behavior is understood in terms of
an individual's assessment of the rewards and satisfactions of the mar
riage relationship in comparison to its associated costs and the poten
tial for rewards in alternative circumstances.

Field theory focuses on

the attractions to the marriage relationship and the barriers against
its breakdown.

Costs and rewards (barriers and attractions) exist both

within the marriage relationship and externally to it.

There are both

costs to remaining in the marital dyad and costs to leaving the dyad.
Similarly, it is posited that there are rewards gained from marriage
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and rewards to be gained by terminating marriage.

The decision to ob

tain a divorce is the result of consideration of each of these four
types of forces which act upon the individual and the relative strengths
of these forces.

These models are particularly appropriate for this

study because they clearly acknowledge the extradyadic factors which
operate in the divorce process as well as the intradyadic factors.

Be

havioral tendency cannot be predicted by knowledge of the individual
alone because each behavior requires a facilitating environment (Yinger,
in Kuo, 1974:77).

It is necessary to account for the entire field, or

social matrix, in understanding divorce behavior and factors affecting
family stability.
Divorce laws are a part of the external environment and thus influ
ence family stability, presumably by increasing the cost of divorce.
The laws have been labeled variously as a source of barrier strength
(Levinger, 1965), as a restraining force against divorce (Kuo, 1974),
*
and as a threshold variable which mediates between marriage and separa
tion (Lewis and Spanier, 1979).

Because they are a conservative soci

etal control designed to protect viable marriages, they stand between
an individual and his or her desire to terminate the marriage.

That

is, it is not possible to avoid the law if one wishes a divorce.
The extent to which the law acts as a barrier will presumably de
pend on its relative importance for the individual in the cost-benefit
analysis and on its own strength as a barrier.

That is, restrictive

laws exert a greater restraining force than more lax laws because they
make divorce more difficult to obtain.

No-fault divorce legislation,

generally assumed to be a liberalization of divorce laws, should de
crease the strength of this barrier to divorce:

this in turn should
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lower the overall cost q £ leaving and increase the likelihood of divorce
behavior.
The dynamics of the relationship between divorce law and divorce
behavior can be demonstrated graphically using an exchange typology de
veloped by Lewis and Spanier (1979).

Figure 2.

An Exchange Typology of Marital Quality and Marital Stability
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This typology is the result of their extensive theory construction ef
forts to relate marital quality to marital stability.

In the diagram

the horizontal axis is the quality axis and represents the interper
sonal aspects of the marriage/divorce decision.

The vertical axis is

the stability axis, accounting for those environmental or broader soci
etal level factors present in decision-making.

Marital stability was

defined by the researchers simply as the formal or informal status of a
marriage as intact or nonintact.

The position of a marital dyad on the

grid depends on the relative strengths of the four vectors.

Specific

couples change position over time as forces in the psychological and
sociological environment change.

Any change which drops the position

below the horizontal axis increases the likelihood of separation and
divorce.

Passage of no-fault divorce legislation reduces the overall

pressure to remain married by decreasing the strength of external pres
sures, vector D.
♦

The result is a downward shift on the vertical axis.

For some number of couples this means a move into the low stability
quadrants and greater potential for divorce.

Areas not experiencing

the legal change would not be subject to that decrease in pressure and
couples would be stable on the extradyadic axis.

All else being equal

no increase in divorce rate would be expected in those areas.
A similar argument can be made using Kuo's (1974) field theory
analysis.

He states that a divorce decision is made if and when the

individual perceives that the total driving force toward divorce is
greater than the restraining force against divorce.
expressed in the relational statement:
1974:15-16) where:

This situation is

(DI + DD) > (RI + RD) (Kuo,
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DI = driving* forces away from marital integra
tion
DD = driving forces toward divorce
RI = restraining forces for marital integra
tion
RD = restraining forces against divorce.
No-fault divorce legislation, by reducing the magnitude of the restrain
ing force against divorce, decreases the sum of the restraining forces
and therefore increases the likelihood that driving forces in the direc
tion of divorce will become relatively more forceful and lead to an in
crease in the number of marriage terminations.
Figure 3 gives an indication of the types of factors associated
with the different forces discussed above.

The comparison of concepts

in field theory (Kuo) and the exchange typology (Lewis and Spanier) is
made by this writer.

Figure 3.

Types of Forces Influencing Divorce Behavior and Sample
Associated Factors

TYPE OF FORCE

Kuo

Lewis and Spanier

DI

Tensions

DD

Alternative attrac
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SAMPLE ASSOCIATED FACTORS3

Attractions
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Lack of communication, values
discrepancy
Preferred alternative sex
partner, wife’s opportunity
for independent income
Companionship, mutual affec
tion, sexual gratification
Legal constraints, proscrip
tive religion, cultural
norms

3

From Kuo (1974), Lewis and Spanier (1979) and Levinger (1965).
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It seems reasonable to assume that marriages already characterized
by low quality might be likely to end in divorce in an atmosphere of re
duced external pressure.

However, the typology of Lewis and Spanier

(1979) and the work of Kuo (1974) suggest that marriages of relatively
high quality also become subject to divorce.
Lewis and Spanier (1979:288).

This issue is addressed by

The researchers note that quadrant II

marriages (high quality, low stability) are rare, but suggest the plau
sibility of an increase in the proportion of these marriages in the fu
ture.

They attribute this to the possibility that relatively happily

married individuals may choose to terminate their marriage in prefer
ence to even more attractive alternatives.

No-fault divorce might

facilitate such a predisposition on the part of both partners in a
marriage.
Discussion so far has focused on the effect of no-fault laws on
intact marriages at the time the law became effective.

It has been

suggested that passage of no-fault divorce laws will increase the di
vorce rate by reducing the salience of one of the social obstacles to
divorce.

It is further suggested that the presence of no-fault divorce

is conducive to higher divorce rates because the law continues to act
in a barrier-reduction manner on intact marriages, leaving them more
open to the possibility of divorce in the future.

It also results in a

lower configuration for external pressures in new marriages which are
formed after the law has been operative.
It is possible that there may be noticeable short-term effects in
addition to the more general long-term impact of no-fault divorce.
This would happen in a situation where many couples were already vacil
lating between maintenance of their marriage and terminating it.

Passage of no-fault would act to bring them into a high divorce risk
configuration.

This backlog of marriages would then become unstable

and produce a sudden sharp rise in the divorce rate.

The rate would

then level off again at a point between the pre-reform and immediate
post-reform rate.

This J-curve effect would be noticeable, for exam

ple, where a significant proportion of couples desired a divorce but
were unable or unwilling to prove grounds and follow through with the
adversary process.
Exchange theory and field theory offer a social-psychological ap
proach to the study of human behavior with a focus on the individual.
Of necessity the present study focuses on states as the unit of analy
sis and not the couples or married partners within the state.

However,

there are some measurable characteristics of states which make it pos
sible to determine the extent to which the environment might be condu
cive to divorce decisions and thus to divorce behavior.

It is recog

nized that states are composed of heterogenous populations.

By using

state-level data the relative presence or absence of the various fac
tors studied can be documented and a composite picture for the state
developed.

This shift from micro- to macro-level is not ideal but is

acceptable for present purposes since changes in divorce law are a
statewide phenomenon.
In summary, the relationship of divorce laws to marital stability
and divorce behavior has been examined within the framework of an ex
change typology developed by Lewis and Spanier (1979).

This typology

is compatible with the concepts of field theory, which is also rele
vant to the study of divorce.

It is suggested that the presence of
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no-fault divorce legislation in a state leads to an increase in the di
vorce rate of that state.
Numerous other factors also effect the divorce rate.

Based on pre

vious research and the theoretical orientation presented here, the fol
lowing additional hypotheses are made:
1)

State divorce rates vary inversely with the
state1s
a) percent of population with ethnic af
filiation
b)
percent of population Catholic
c)
percent of families with children
present
d) percent of population high school
graduates
e) per capita income

2)

State divorce rates vary directly with the
state* s
a) migration rate
b) percent in manufacturing of civilian
labor force
c)
percent of population urban
d)
percent participation in labor force
by women
e) percent of civilian labor force un
employed
f) percent of population 18-64 years old
g) crude marriage rate

Approximately half of the factors represented in these hypotheses are
posited to exert their greatest influence on the extradyadic (vertical)
axis in the Lewis and Spanier typology.

These factors are ethnicity,

Catholicism, migration, industrialization (manufacturing) and urbaniza
tion.

In general this group of variables influences barrier strengths

against divorce.

Extant empirical analyses demonstrate a clear impact

on the divorce rate by these variables, and this influence must be ac
counted for in the present attempt to determine the independent impact
of the legal variables used here on the divorce rate.

Presence of chil

dren, education, income, unemployment, and labor force participation by

women constitute a second group of variables, identified here largely
because of their influence on the intradyadic dimension (horizontal
axis) in the exchange typology.

Their influence on divorce rates are

less clear from the empirical literature but this influence should also
be recognized and controlled statistically in this study.

There are

undoubtedly additional variables which contribute to changes in divorce
" rates.

It is believed that, within the limits of availability of state-

level data, the ones included here represent major factors relevant to
both the personal and the environmental aspects of divorce decisions.
Further discussion of the hypothesized nature of the relationship of
each of the variables with state divorce rates, along with comments on
operationalizations of the variables, are included in Chapter Five.

CHAPTER FOUR
PREVIOUS STUDIES

The relationship between divorce law reform and divorce rates is a
relatively unexplored area in divorce study.

The literature indicates

that most of the studies related to marital instability as measured by
divorce rates have dealt largely with socio-economic factors and have
approached the issue from a micro-level orientation with emphasis on
the individual.

Consideration of law as a variable useful in

explain

ing variation in divorve rates isinfrequent, as is macro-level analy
sis with a focus on states as the unit of study.
Early research efforts focused on grounds for divorce as
cator of divorce law.

an indi

'As early as 1891 Willcox documented the lack of

any clear relationship between either the number of grounds for divorce
in a state, or a change in that number, and the state divorce rate
(Lichtenberger, 1931; O ’Neill, 1967; Rheinstein, 1972).

Subsequent

studies (Lichtenberger, 1931:181-186; Kirkpatrick, reported in Stetson
and Wright, 1975:541) revealed a similar lack of relationship.

In the

fault-based system there was little empirically-supported reason to
expect that legislative changes in the grounds for divorce would re
sult in changes in divorce rates.
all conclusion, that " . . .

This is in line with Willcox’s over

the immediate, direct and measurable influ

ence of legislation is subsidiary, unimportant, almost imperceptible”
(in Lichtenberger, 1931:185-186).
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In the mid-1970s a^report was published by Stetson and Wright (1975)
which was significant for at least three reasons.

It recognized the need

to incorporate legal variables along with the familiar nonlegal variables
in a study of divorce rates.

It also employed a more sophisticated mea

sure for the divorce law variable, although noting measurement difficul
ties as a possible weakness in the study.

Finally, the report produced

findings contrary to those of previous research.
The Stetson and Wright (1975) research indicates that divorce pol
icy per se does have an independent effect on state divorce rates.
Using a regression model with states as units of analysis, Stetson and
Wright examined the relationship between state divorce rates for the
year 1960 and three groups of independent variables.

Each of the three

groups, economic development, social costs of divorce, and divorce pol
icy permissiveness, had multiple indicators.
of divorce policy permissiveness.

There were two measures

The statute law index reflected the

number of grounds available for divorce.

The implementation index, de

veloped by Broel-Plateris, reflected the permissiveness of actual im
plementation of the statutes by the courts.

The partial correlation

coefficients for the law index and implementation index, controlling
for all other independent variables, were .47 and .61 respectively.
These were higher than comparable coefficients for any of the other
variables.

From their study Stetson and Wright drew three major con

clusions:

(1) a strong relationship exists between permissiveness of

divorce laws and divorce rates;

(2) the relationship remains when ef

fects of variations in economic development and social costs are con
trolled; and (3) the effect of economic and social processes on divorce
rates are substantially reduced when permissiveness of law and
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implementation are controlled.

Based on the data they suggest that per

missiveness of state divorce laws is a major determinant of state di
vorce rates.

This is the only study encountered by this reviewer which

shows some aspect of the divorce law to be a factor in state divorce
rates.
Applicability of the Stetson and Wright research to current studies
of divorce laws and rates is limited by the operationalization of the
divorce policy variables.

The law index for each state is based on the

presence or absence of five specific grounds for divorce.

Because the

new divorce laws eliminate grounds for divorce this is not an appropri
ate index for prediction in no-fault states.
raises serious methodological questions.

The implementation index

It is based on responses from

a panel of sixty-eight "experts in family law" throughout the United
States (Stetson and Wright, 1975:541).

In the absence of better mea

sures it is an important step toward accounting for variation in imple
mentation of the law.

However, the scale was developed in 1959 and it

is unclear what changes would result if new surveys were administered.
Efforts to apply comparable indices appropriate for use in no-fault and
fault states have not been reported.

The concept of implementation is

likely to remain an important factor, methodologically accounting for
the difference between the "law on the books" (statute law) and the
"law in action" (implementation) discussed by Rheinstein (1972) and
others.
Three studies deal specifically with the impact of no-fault di
vorce legislation on divorce rates.

This is not surprising in view of

the historical pattern of oversight concerning the effect of the laws
and also the recent emergence of the no-fault concept in state policy.
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Each of the studies tested the hypothesis that the presence of no-fault
divorce laws in a state

leads to an increase in that state*s divorce

rate.

support the hypothesis.

None was able to
Wright and Stetson

(1978) also conducted an empirical

termine whether the introduction of

marital breakdown as a

study to de
basis fordi

vorce has contributed to increases in divorce in the United States.
study covered the years 1960-1974.

The

The researchers first determined

which states adopted no-fault laws and which did not during that time.
It is noted that they used a strict definition of no-fault, excluding
states with separation and incompatibility grounds as not representative
of the principle of marital breakdown evidenced in the new laws.

State

divorce rates for the reform group were adjusted, using the mean rate
for no-reform states, to account for annual changes that presumably
would have occurred as a result of normal increase.

Results indicate

little support for the hypothesis that breakdown provisions lead to an
increase in divorce rates (Wright and Stetson, 1978:578).

This finding

held up under additional rate adjustments to correct for any linear
trend that might be influencing the data.
Wright and Stetson (1978) approached their research with the con
cept of no-fault divorce as a liberalizing measure, which is the view
generally expressed in the literature.

Since the data reveal no impact

of the new laws on the state divorce rates they question the assumption
that the laws actually make the divorce process more permissive.

This

follows from their finding in 1975 that measures of permissiveness of
divorce laws are strongly related to divorce in the various states.
They note the influence of other issues also regulated by divorce law
(e.g. residency requirements, custody) and the difference in the laws
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from state to state as possible factors which prevent breakdown provi
sions from exerting a permissive influence on the divorce process.
Research by Mazur-Hart and Berman (1977) provides additional evi
dence that divorce rates are not significantly influenced by the passage
of no-fault divorce legislation.

Their study, based, on the state of

Nebraska, used an interrupted time-series quasiexperimental design with
separate analysis for four control variables.

While the frequencies of

divorce in Nebraska increased systematically during the time studied,
the increase appeared to be totally unrelated to the no-fault legisla
tion (Mazur-Hart and Berman, 1977:309).

Two variables, length of mar

riage and age at divorce, showed short-term effects.

Long-term effects

were revealed for the race variable, which was used in this study as an
indicator for socio-economic status.

Divorce'levels among blacks in

creased following the inception of no-fault divorce.

The authors pos

tulate that no-fault divorce has helped to relieve the financial burden
of divorce in Nebraska and therefore has contributed to an increase in
the number of divorces among lower income families.
A third study of no-fault divorce law reform and increasing divorce
rates is that of Kenneth Sell (1979).

The most recent of the studies

reported here, Sell uses a four-way classification of all states for the
period 1968-1976.

2

By his categorization incompatibility and separation

statutes are defined as no-fault in addition to the recent breakdown

The states are grouped by type of divorce law as follows:
(1) no
fault grounds only; (2) fault grounds only; (3) mixed: incompatibility
added to fault grounds — defined so that irreconcilable differences,
irretrievable breakdown, and incompatibility are used interchangeably;
and (4) mixed: separation added to fault grounds. Sell notes that five
states have both separation and incompatibility added to fault grounds
and he lists these states separately.

statutes.

Noting that adequate post-change data are not available at

this time for a time-series Study, Sell limited his analysis to "eyeballing” the plotted divorce rates and a comparison of mean rates for
the change and no-change states.

He considers statistical tests inap

propriate for the data because of the assumptions necessary for these
tests (Sell, 1979:302).

His results indicate that fault-only states had

the smallest increase in divorce rate during the period studied but that
this increase did not differ substantially from the increase found in
each of the other groups of states.

Sell concluded that changes in the

grounds for divorce do not substantially increase the divorce rates in
the fifty states.
The empirical evidence suggests that changes in divorce laws have
not contributed significantly in either a positive or-negative direc
tion to the rate of divorce in the various states.

CHAPTER FIVE
METHODOLOGY

The basic research question addressed in this thesis is:

"Does the

presence of no-fault legislation in a state contribute to an increase in
the divorce rate of that state?"

The finding of a positive relationship

between a measure of the divorce rate and an indicator of divorce law
would suggest an affirmative answer.

States were used as the unit of

analysis because regulation of divorce law is a matter of state control
and changes occur at this level.
(N=45).

The number of cases is forty-five

Four states, Arkansas, Indiana, Louisiana, and New Mexico are

excluded from analysis due to incomplete reporting of basic divorce rate
measures.

Nevada is excluded because of its extreme divorce and mar

riage rates which are two and nine times higher, respectively, than the
next highest comparable state rates.
A cross-sectional design with simple correlation and multiple re
gression analysis was used.

Sub-programs in the Statistical Package for

the Social Sciences (SPSS) provided data analysis.

Raw input data were

collected for each state from published reports, chiefly those of the
United States Bureau of the Census (see Appendix B for details).
Twenty-seven variables were identified.
rate, the dependent variable.
the independent variable.
control variables.

Nine were measures of divorce

There were two indicators of divorce law,

Remaining variables served as independent

A complete zero-order correlation matrix was
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generated.

From this matrix the strongest predictor variables were cho

sen for further analysis in stepwise multiple regression equations.

In

clusion criteria for control variables in regression analysis were not
predetermined.
The crude divorce rate (CDR), the number of divorces per thousand
population, was used in measuring the dependent variable.

One limita

t i o n of the CDR is that the population on which it is based includes
persons not "at risk" in divorce, such as children and older single per
sons.

Data necessary to compute more precise measures, such as the re

fined divorce rate or standardized rates, were not available by state.
However, the similarity in long-term trends reflected by both the crude
rate and the refined rate suggest the basic validity of the CDR (Scanzoni, 1972:8).
Four divorce rate variables were identified initially:

DIVORCE1,

the 1960 CDR; DIVORCE2, the 1978 CDR; RATECHNG, the amount of change in
CDR 1960-1978; and QRTILE, the quartile ranking by 1978 CDR.

Changes

in the divorce rates for the period 1960-1970 were included to account
for any pre-reform trends evidenced in the state rates which may have
continued on into the 1970s.

Changes in rates beginning in 1970 and

continuing through 1978 would reflect any shifts brought about by leg
islative reform.

The upper limit is set at 1978 because divorce rates

for subsequent years are not yet available.

The eighteen year period

also reflects the fact that legislative reform may be a result as well
as a cause of increasing divorce rates.

To examine this possibility

and to discover if the longer period may have biased the results, sep
arate analyses of divorce rate measures were obtained for each of the
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decades.

The amount of change in CDR 1960-1970 was labeled CHNG60S.

The

corresponding change for 1970-1978 was labeled CHNG70S.
An index labeled DIVSCORE was created by obtaining the product of
the values for RATECHNG and QRTILE.

In the event that the component

variables were moderately correlated with each other the divorce score
index would provide a useful measure for the dependent variable, reflect
ing both the magnitude of the divorce rate and the amount of change in
the rate over the period studied.

This composite measure would be pref

erable to the other indicators which could capture only one aspect of
the divorce rate.

A comparable index for the 1970s (SCORE70S) was also

created.
Definition of the independent variable raises some questions (see
Chapter 2).

Some definitions of no-fault divorce are' more inclusive

than others.

In this research six groups of states were identified on

the basis of the type of divorce law on the books in the state:
•

1
2
3
4
5
6

=
=
=
=
=
=

Breakdown (no-fault) Only (N=15)
Breakdown plus Fault (N=14)
Separation < 1 year plus Fault (N=6)
Separation > 1 year plus -Fault (N=4)
Incompatibility plus Fault (N=3)
Fault Only (N=3).

This classification was labeled DIVLAW.

These six groups were then col

lapsed into a three-way classification (DIVLAWR):
1 = Breakdown Only (N=15) = 1 above
2 = Mixed (N=20) = 2 and 3 above
3 = Fault Only (N=10) = 4-6 above.
Fifteen independent (control) variables were used in the study.
See Table 1, page 45 for a complete variable list with labels and opera
tional definition.

Below is a brief discussion of the predictor vari

ables and additional information about their measurement and reason for
selection.
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Table 1.

Variable List ,and Operational Definitions

Variable

Operational Definition

DIVORCE 1

crude divorce rate, 1960

DRATE70

crude divorce rate, 1970

DIVORCE2

crude divorce rate, 1978

CHNG60S

amount

of change in CDR, 1960-1970

CHNG70S

amount

of change in CDR, 1970-1978

RATECHNG

amount

of change in CDR, 1960-1978

QRTILE

quartile ranking by CDR, 1978 (1 = low, 4 = high)

DIVSCORE

product of RATECHNG and QRTILE

SCORE70S

product of CHNG7QS and QRTILE

NUMGRNDS

total number of grounds for divorce, 1978

DIVLAW

categorization by type of divorce law(s), 1978
1 = Breakdown (no-fault) Only
2 = Breakdown plus Fault
3 = Separation < 1 year plus Fault
4 = Separation > 1 year plus Fault
5 - Incompatibility plus Fault
6 = Fault Only

DIVLAWR

recoded
1 =
2 =
3 =

RACE

quartile ranking by percent of total population black,
1976

ETHNIC

percent of population with parentage of foreign stock,
1970

CATHOLIC

percent of population Catholic, 1979

CHILD18

percent of families with own children under 18 years
present, 1970

ONECHILD

percent of families with one child under 18 years
present, 1970

categorization by type of law(s), 1978
Breakdown Only (1 above)
Mixed (2 and 3 above)
Fault Only (4-6 above)
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Variable List and Operational Definitions
(continued)

Variable

Operational Definition

GE4CHILD

percent of families with four or more children under
18 present, 1970

WOMLABOR

percent participation in labor force by women, 1978

UNEMPLOY

percent of civilian labor force unemployed, 1978

INCOME

per capita, 1975

EDUCATN

percent of population high school graduates, 1976

INDUST

percent in manufacturing of employed civilian labor
force, 1970

URBAN

percent of population urban, 1970

MIGRATN

percent net change of population, 1970-1977

MGRATE

crude marriage rate, 1978

AGE

percent of population 18-64 years old, 1978
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Two of the variables might be considered "risk" factors which help
compensate for inadequacies in the CDR.
tion aged 18-64 is one measure.
decisions.

The proportion of the popula

This age is most at risk in divorce

Due to insufficient data it was not possible to break age

(AGE) down into additional categories.

A summary category was accepted.

Marriage rates (MGRATE) were also obtained on the assumption that more
marriages means more potential divorces.
Three of the control variables have been identified as social cost
factors in previous divorce studies (Stetson and Wright, 1975; Fenelon,
1971).

Their impact on divorce rates is well documented.

Ethnicity

(ETHNIC) and Catholicism (CATHOLIC) represent social and religious bar
riers to marriage termination.

High in-group solidarity and social con

trol act to reinforce traditional norms of fainily stability.

The mea

sure of Catholicism used here is percent of the population Catholic.

It

is based on religious affiliation and does not reflect devoutness, fre
quency of church attendance or other aspects of religious commitment.
Other denominations could not be included because of insufficient data.
However, proscriptions against divorce are strongest in the Catholic
church and are only now beginning to be relaxed.

Fenelon (1971) pro

vides strong evidence of the importance of migration rates (MIGRATN) in
explaining divorce rates.

In areas where the population is relatively

mobile social integration is weak and the impact of social norms and
constraints is reduced.
The processes of urbanization (URBAN) and industrialization (INDUST)
operate similarly to the migration factor.

These variables are indica

tors of the increasing scale of society as discussed by the social area
model as it relates to urban development (in Timms, 1971:123-210).

As
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societal scale, or modernization, increases, structural changes occur
within the society which affect the scope of interaction and dependency
among the members of that society.

The three indicators of this process

used here act indirectly to reduce the social costs of divorce by con
tributing to a breakup of traditional family patterns and functions.
They also result in lower levels of community integration and its asso
ciated network of influence.
Less research has been done on the presence of children in a mar
riage as a source of barrier strength against divorce.

Jacobson and

Monahan (in Levinger, 1965:24) report that childless couples are more
likely to separate than parental couples, and Renne (in Scanzoni and
Scanzoni, 1976:376) found that persons currently raising children are
more likely than those not currently raising children to report marital
dissatisfaction.

While children may increase the cost of remaining in

marriage an obligation to dependent children apparently acts as a bar*

rier to divorce.

As societal emphasis on familism gives way to individ

ualism the strength of that barrier can be expected to fluctuate.

Pres

ence of children might also increase the cost of divorce by complicating
the divorce process with issues of child custody, visitation rights and
financial support.

There were three indicators for this variable, one

determining the proportion of the population having children under
eighteen years of age present (CHILD18) and two others based on the num
ber of children present (ONECHILD, GE4CHILD).

In his economic analysis

of divorce Becker (1977) identifies children as "marriage-specific" cap
ital.

Their utility or reward value is substantially decreased outside

of the marriage context.

According to this perspective, the more
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children one has the greater the cost of divorce and the greater the re
ward of marriage.
Several socio-economic factors are important.

Income (INCOME) is

inversely related to divorce rates according to studies which include an
income measure (see Levinger, 1965:21-23).

Higher incomes enable cou

ples to increase the attractions to marriage by having or doing those
items and activities which are considered rewarding.

The concept of de

sertion as the "poor man* s divorce" would seem to contradict this and
suggest that lower income couples would be less likely to divorce due to
financial constraints.

As more couples stay above poverty level the

economic feasibility of divorce improves.

This view of desertion is

even more questionable today because of the 1971 Supreme Court ruling in
Boddie v. Connecticut that access to divorce courts cannot be denied due
to inability of the petitioner to pay for the divorce (Kargman, 1973:
246; Glendon, 1977:230).

Race (RACE) is a factor which is difficult to

analyze independently because it is so closely associated with income.
It has been measured here by quartile ranking because census data for
percent of population black includes twelve missing values.

Education

(EDUCATN), like income, is inversely related to divorce rates (Scanzoni
and Scanzoni, 1976; Scanzoni, 1972; Levinger, 1965) and positively re
lated to marital quality (Lewis and Spanier, 1979).

It is generally

explained in terms of increased opportunities for rewards and satisfac
tion in the marriage.

The relationship between education and divorce

is sex-related (Glick, 1975; Scanzoni, 1972:18-19).

Scanzoni (1972)

notes that for both men and women high school graduation contributes to
marital stability.

The indicator for education used here is the per

cent of the population who are high school graduates.

The median number
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of school years completed was an unacceptable measure because the range
for all states was 0.8 years.
Two variables not generally included in divorce studies are women
in the labor force (WOMLABOR) and unemployment (UNEMPLOY).
of women in the labor force is increasing.

The percent

It is suggested that this

variable is positively associated with divorce rates.

Participation in

the labor force will reduce to some extent the strength of economic de
pendency as a barrier to divorce for women while increasing the strength
of alternative attractions.

This factor parallels changes in tradi

tional sex-based family roles and responsibilities.

As this occurs

there is also the potential for increased marital tension.

Unemployment

affects income, also, and would be expected to indirectly increase di
vorce rate measures for this reason.
tor.

It is generally' a short-term fac

This might be particularly significant in no-fault states because

relatively little time elapses before divorce is granted.

Otherwise the

tensions caused by temporary unemployment might have abated sufficiently
to cause an individual or couple to reconsider the divorce decision.

To

the extent that unemployment is considered long-term and/or is viewed as
a chronic problem it can act to increase marital tensions and the driv
ing force away from marital integration.

CHAPTER SIX
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Divorce Score and Divorce Law Indices

The zero-order correlation matrix for selected variables is given
in Table 3, page 53.

o

taken from this matrix.

Correlation coefficients quoted in the text are
Analysis of the relationship between the com

ponent variables of the divorce score index showed the rate of change
in the divorce rate (RATECHNG) and the quartile ranking by divorce rate
(QRTILE) to be moderately correlated (r = 0.584).

This index (DIVSCORE)

was used as the measure of the dependent variable in subsequent regres
sion analysis.

In order to have a comparable divorce rate measure for

the period 1970-1978 when no-fault laws were in effect, a second index
(SCORE70S) was used in limited additional analysis.

It is noted that

the component variables for this index, CHNG70S and QRTILE, were only
weakly related (r = 0.259).
As expected from previous studies (Lichtenberger, 1931; Kirkpatrick
in Stetson and Wright, 1975) the number of grounds for divorce in a
state (NUMGRNDS) showed little or no relationship to any of the divorce
rate measures (r = -0.014 to -0.109).

This variable distinguishes

3Correlation coefficients, means and standard deviations
reported for the decade-specific divorce rate variables which
only in limited additional analysis.
Statistical information
variables (SCORE70S, CHNG60S, CHNG70S, DRATE70S) is available
from the author.
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are not
were used
for these
by request

52

Table 2.

Means and Standard Deviations for Selected Variables

Variable

Mean

DIVORCE1

2.253

1.110

DIV0RCE2

5.256

1.487

RATECHNG

2.998

0.741

QRTILE

2.511

1.121

NUMGRNDS

6.489

4.424

DIVLAW

2.444

1.531

DIVLAWR

1.889

0.745

RACE

2.511

1.121

ETHNIC

14.847

9.518

CATHOLIC

19.276

13.128

CHILD 18

56.091

3.156

ONECHILD

17.893

1.175

GE4CHILD

10.431

1 .872

WOMLABOR

50.998

4.420

UNEMPLOY

5.753

1.513

4741.178

725.374

EDUCATN

67.593

7.241

INDUST

22.951

9.170

URBAN

65.718

14.931

9.411

8. 158

MGRATE

10.644

2.581

AGE

70.367

2.164

8.002

4.783

INCOME

MIGRATN

DIVSCORE

Standard Deviation
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Table 3.

Zero-Order Correlation Matrix for Selected Variables

DIVORCE!

DIVORCE2

RATECHNG

QRTILE

NUMGRNDS

DIVLAW

DIVORCE2

.882

1 .000

RATECHNG

.255

.681

1 .000

QRTILE

.882

.954

.584

1 .000

NUMGRNDS

-.070

-.055

-.014

-.088

1 .000

DIVLAW

-.191

1

CM

-.115

-.215

.518

1 .000

DIVLAWR

-.191

-.179

-.075

-.175

.713

.921

.027

-.038

-.125

.023

.136

.090

ETHNIC

-.423

-.371

-.103

, -.378

-.081

-.046

CATHOLIC

-.538

-.541

-.272

-.558

.077

.046

CHILD!8

.010

.154

.296

.161

-.033

.124

ONECHILD

.151

.228

.227

.267

.172

.118

GE4CHILD

-.126

-.101

-.011

-.109

-.01 7

.095

WOMLABOR

-.128

-.003

.196

-.018

-.208

.050

UNEMPLOY

.140

.269

.328

.249

-.021

-.049

INCOME

.031

.168

.298

.098

-.177

.143

EDUCATN

.063

.167

.252

.152

-.394

-.048

-.360

-.356

1

0
CO

-.320

.337

.076

URBAN

.018

-.012

-.048

.043

-.153

-.054

MIGRATN

.586

.732

.584

.676

-.130

-.100

MGRATE

.533

.507

.214

.511

.116

.176

-.272

-.304

-.200

-.155

-.146

.689

.932

.844

-.109

-.185

RACE

INDUST

AGE
DIVSCORE

•

1 .000

o

DIVORCE1

_

-.300 ‘
.911
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Zero-Order Correlation Matrix for Selected Variables
(continued)

DIVLAWR

DIVLAWR

RACE

ETHNIC

CATHOLIC

CHILD18

ONECHILD

1.000
.070

1.000

-.031

-.388

1.000

CATHOLIC

.039

-.301

.852

1.000

CHILD18

.174

-.369

.009

-.164

1.000

ONECHILD

.199

.545

-.389

-.477

.301

1.000

GE4CHILD

.118

-.627

.104

.063

.703

-.356

WOMLABOR

-.019

-.248

.134

.113

.525

.062

UNEMPLOY

* -.035

.102

.195

.056

.261

.339

.043

-.124

.398

.253

.416

.136

-.152

-.608

.454

.251

.431

-.399

.166

.499

.038

.260

-.299

.221

URBAN

-.070

.217

.542

.400

-.109

.047

MIGRATN

-.096

-.295

-. 195

-.394

.433

.166

.226

-.054

-.512

-.588

.235

.233

AGE

-.242

.340

.333

.420

-.740

-.136

DIVSCORE

-.164

-.086

-.272

-.470

.258

.237

RACE
ETHNIC

INCOME
EDUCATN
INDUST

MGRATE
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Zero-Order Correlation Matrix for Selected Variables
(continued)

WOMLABOR

UNEMPLOY

INCOME

EDUCATN

INDUST

GE4CHILD

1 .000

WOMLABOR

.307

1 .000

UNEMPLOY

-.022

-.057

1 .000

INCOME

.062

.472

.502

1 .000

EDUCATN

.410

.522

-.023

.597

1 .000

INDUST

-.381

-.200

.085

-.241

-.478

1 .000

URBAN

-.311

-.031

.187

.436

.332

.131

MIGRATN

.274

.203

.271

.286

.322

-.503

MGRATE

.140

.069

-.110

-.215

-.076

-.349

AGE

-.742

-.163

-.079

.023

-.126

.347

DIVSCORE

i
o

GE4CHILD

.117

.330

.267

.280

-.351

URBAN

MIGRATN

MGRATE

AGE

URBAN

1 .000

MIGRATN

-.093

1 .000

MGRATE

-.307

.467

1.000

AGE

.350

-.534

-.506

1.000

DIVSCORE

.022

.750

.428

-.291

DIVSCORE

1 .000
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clearly between breakdown states (NUMGRNDS = 1 or 2) and states retaining
fault (4 < NUMGRNDS < 15); however, it does not distinguish adequately
between fault-only states and mixed states, all of which have multiple
grounds for divorce.

It was eliminated from additional study for these

reasons.
Output from the multiple regression on DIVSCORE is presented in Ta
ble 4, page 57.

Three variables (RACE, GE4CHILD, URBAN) whose correla

tion with DIVSCORE was less than 0.10 are excluded, as are variables ex
plaining less than one percent of the variance in the dependent variable
(ONECHILD, WOMLABOR, MGRATE, INDUST).

Three additional variables (ETH

NIC, INCOME, CHILD18) were eliminated on the basis of high collinearity
with other included variables as described below:
ETHNIC with CATHOLIC, r = 0.852
INCOME with EDUCATN, r = 0.600
CHILD18 with AGE, r = -0.740.

'

Multiple regression analysis reveals that the divorce law index is
the least important predictor variable in the regression equation (Ta
ble 4, page 57).

A standardized unit increase in the divorce law mea

sure has virtually no effect on the divorce score index (BETA = 0.072).
This lack of relationship had been suggested in the correlation analysis.
It was also apparent in the regression on the 1970s divorce score index
(BETA = .068, R

= .484, not shown) and on the 1970s divorce rate change

(BETA = .098, R^ = .286, not shown).

Despite holding constant the im

pact of the other variables, indicators of the divorce law and the di
vorce rate appear to be unrelated.

The major hypothesis that the pres

ence of no-fault divorce leads to an increase in state divorce rates is
not accepted.

Evidence indicates that no-fault laws neither increase
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Table 4.

Multiple Regression Analysis on the Divorce Score Index

Variable

MIGRATN

Zero-Order
Correlation Coefficient
(r)

Standardized
Regression Coefficient
(BETA)

.750

.614

CATHOLIC

-.470

-.405

AGE

-.291

.299

UNEMPLOY

.330

.250

EDUCATN

.280

.233

DIVLAWR

-.164

.072

R2 = 0.710
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nor decrease the divorce rate.

This lack of relationship is demon

strated graphically by the smoothness of the curve in Figure 4, page 59.
This finding supports previous research on the impact of no-fault
legislation on divorce rates (Mazur-Hart and Berman, 1977; Wright and
Stetson, 1978; Sell, 1979).

Wright and Stetson (1978) further suggested

that no-fault divorce legislation is not a permissive law, based on
their earlier finding (1975) that measures of permissiveness of divorce
laws are strongly related to state divorce rates.

If this suggestion is

correct then the divorce law index used here (DIVLAWR) represents a nom
inal level scale because no hierarchy of liberalization exists.

On the

other hand the suggestion is questionable since measures of the permis
siveness indices used by Stetson and Wright (1975) assume a fault-based
system.

The law index is based on the number of certain specified

grounds for divorce on the books in a state; but no-fault divorce elim
inates grounds for divorce.

The implementation index is based on the

comparative laxity with which the statute law is administered; but there
is reason to suspect that there might be little variation in implementa
tion of no-fault statutes.

Apparently the courts in general do not ex

ercise the discretion they have in implementing the new laws (see Chap
ter 2, page 16).

At the same time corollary issues of custody, support

and property division still vary among the states having breakdown stat
utes.

Permissiveness could continue to make substantial differences in

these aspects of the dissolution laws.

Previous discussion using the

exchange typology assumes that the laws are permissive and therefore
that they reduce the barrier strength of legal constraints.

If they are

not permissive then the null hypothesis would have been predicted.

In

the absence of permissiveness indicators applicable to both traditional
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Figure 4.

United States^Crude Divorce Rate 1960-1978,a With Number of
States Enacting No-Fault Legislation Per Yearb

N=0

N=2
N=3
N=7

5 -N=3

N=3

N=3
N=8

3 -N=6

1962

1964

1966

1968

1970

1972

1974

1976

1978

aUnited States, Bureau of the Census (1975, 1979) and United States,
National Center for Health Statistics (1978).
bSell (1979:203).
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laws and no-fault laws there remains a question as to whether no-fault
laws liberalize the divorce process.

Other explanations are needed to

help understand the lack of relationship between laws and rates.
The conceptual framework introduced in chapter three suggests that
one alternative explanation relates to public awareness of the laws.
Both field theory and exchange theory are based on the individual*s per
ception of the total environment and his assessment of the cost-benefit
ratio in decision-making.

Laws must be present in the decision-making

process in order to influence it.

A study of the impact of new laws re

quires the assumption that individuals are aware of the significance of
the changes made.

Research by Deckert and Langelier (reported in Sell,

1979:301) indicates that following Canadian divorce law reform forty-two
percent of the Quebec residents studied were not aware of the changes
that had been made.

Of those who were aware of the changes, ninety-one

percent reported they were not influenced by the prospect of more liberal laws.

Sell suggests that the situation in the United States would

probably be similar to that in Quebec, although there is no research
evidence to support or invalidate that suggestion.
Rheinstein (1972) support the assumption.

Implications from

Rheinstein points out that

compromise between the law on the books and the law in action under the
fault system was worked out quietly among judges, lawyers and divorcing
persons (Rheinstein, 1972:254).

It was not open to public view because

of the ethical issues involved in acknowledged perjury and other law
accommodation procedures.

To some extent the change to no-fault divorce

may have been an extension of this backroom process in which those di
rectly involved sought a more acceptable solution to the problem.

It

was not possible in this study to measure at the state level the extent
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of publicity about divorce laws or to determine the amount of public
awareness of legal reform.

It is only noted here that any potential im

pact of laws on divorce rates may be a function of public awareness, and
that indirect evidence suggests that the awareness is low.

In this case

no-fault laws could not act to reduce the social barrier to divorce,
which in turn could not increase the likelihood of divorce decisions.
The Deckert and Langelier study (in Sell, 1979) indicates that even
when awareness is adequate, the influence of reform is not extensive.
Only ten percent of the Quebec respondents claimed to be influenced, and
we do not know in what way they were influenced.

Any barrier reduction

accompanying reform appears to be quite slight.
A second alternative explanation for the lack of relationship be
tween laws and rates involves the direction of causality.

No-fault leg

islation may be a consequent of increasing divorce rates rather than a
cause of further increase.

To check this possibility a multiple regres

sion analysis was obtained using the divorce law index (DIVLAWR) as the
dependent variable (Table 5, page 62).

Twenty-five percent of the vari

ance in the law index could be explained by the combined impact of the
variables.

The divorce score measure, used here as an independent vari

able, had the second largest BETA in the equation, contributing a stan
dardized decrease of 0.329 of the standard deviation of the law vari
able.

This suggests that divorce rates do influence the divorce laws

of a state.

The negative direction of the relationship indicates that

states with higher divorce rates are more likely to have lenient (no
fault) divorce laws.
Consideration of the separate divorce rate variables for the 1960s
(CHNG60S) and the 1970s (SCORE70S, CHNG70S) provides additional
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Table 5.

Multiple Regression Analysis on the Divorce Law Index

Variable

Zero-Order
Correlation Coefficient
(r)

Standardized
Regression Coefficient
(BETA)

-.242

-.256

INDUST

.166

.234

MGRATE

.226

.330

DIVSCORE

-.164

-.329

ONECHILD

.199

.175

-.152

.128

AGE

EDUCATN

R

= 0.255
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information.

The impact of these variables on the divorce law index is

less than that revealed by the general divorce score index discussed
above (Tables 6-8, pages 64-66).

However, the results show that among

the decade-specific variables the greatest influence on the laws is found
in the amount of change during the 1960s (BETA = -0.220).

Furthermore,

the direction of the impact of the change during the 1970s is positive
(BETA = 0.108), suggesting that those states with higher amounts of
change during the 1970s were more likely to be states having restrictive
laws.

The signs and relative strengths of the zero-order correlation co

efficients for the 1960 and 1970 rate change variables with the divorce
law index are the same as the BETA coefficients (r = -0.216 and r = 0.158,
respectively).

This information suggests that no-fault legislation,

where enacted, may tend to suppress the growth in state divorce rates.
The reader is cautioned that in none of the regression equations
was more than twenty-five percent of the variance in divorce laws poli
cies explained, and that the divorce rate measures accounted for only a
small fraction of that percentage.
quite small.

The net. impact on the law index is

It must be remembered that although the first no-fault

laws were enacted in 1970, most were passed in subsequent years.

The

impact of the CHNG70S variable still cannot account for this time dif
ferential.

More sophisticated measurement techniques and the passage

of more time are needed to clarify this relationship.
Historically, as divorce rates increased over the years there was
a subsequent but parallel trend toward more restrictive laws (Lichtenberger, 1931:171).

(The exception to this trend, noted by Lichtenber-

ger, has been the grounds for divorce, one aspect of divorce law which
has not become more stringent.)

This relationship between increasing
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Table 6.

Multiple Regression Analysis with Decade-Specific Divorce Rate
Measures on the Divorce Law Index:
1970s Divorce Score Index

Zero-Order
Correlation Coefficient
(r)

Standardized
Regression Coefficient
(BETA)

-.242

-.280

INDUST

.166

.286

MGRATE

.226

.287

-.046

-.140

Variable

AGE

SCORE70S

R2 = .199
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Table 7.

Multiple Regression Analysis with Decade-Specific Divorce Rate
Measures on the Divorce Law Index:
1960s Divorce Rate Change

Variable

Zero-Order
Correlation Coefficient
(r)

Standardized
Regression Coefficient
(BETA)

-.242

-.281

INDUST

.166

.260

MGRATE

.226

.241

-.216

-.192

AGE

CHNG60S

R2 = .218
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Table 8.

Multiple Regression Analysis with Decade-Specific Divorce Rate
Measures on the Divorce Law Index:
1970s Divorce Rate Change

Variable

Zero-Order
Correlation Coefficient
(r)

Standardized
Regression Coefficient
(BETA)

-.242

-.265

INDUST

.166

.281

MGRATE

.226

.220

CHNG70S

.158

.115

AGE

R2 = .195
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rates and legal reform relates to the "legalistic habit of mind" also
discussed by Lichtenberger (1931:162).

Society identifies a social

problem, enacts legislation to control the problem, and expects the law
to affect behavior.

This pattern of legislative reaction continued in

divorce law despite evidence indicating that the restrictive laws did
not influence divorce rates.

The no-fault laws appear to be in part a

continuation of this trend.

They may be characterized as a reaction to

increasing divorce rates rather than a catalyst for further increase.
States experiencing relatively high divorce rate increases during the
1960s were likely to pass no-fault legislation.

These states in turn

experienced relatively low divorce rate increases during the 1970s, a
result not seen in the effect of the earlier restrictive measures.
The conclusion drawn from this research is that "there is a rela
tionship between divorce laws and divorce rates but that it is demon
strated when the laws are viewed as an effect of increasing rates rather
than a potential cause of them.

Remaining Independent Variables

Multiple regression analysis shows that migration, unemployment and
age distribution of the population are positively related to the divorce
score index (Table 4, page 57).
2f (page 34) are accepted.

For this reason hypotheses 2a, 2e and

The regression analysis also shows a nega

tive relationship between Catholicism and the divorce score index, which
leads to acceptance of hypothesis 1b (page 34).
The hypothesis concerning the relationship between the divorce rate
and the proportion of the population with a high school education is not
accepted because the direction of the relationship is opposite from the
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predicted direction.

A ^possible explanation for the increase in divorce

score accompanying increases in the education measure is the greater ac
cessibility to alternative attractions outside the marriage.

In states

where more people have a high school diploma the wherewithal to obtain
rewards from other sources increases.

There is no way to tell whether

states with high education scores have more residents with advanced edu
cation, a factor which is associated with increasing marital instability
for women (Glick, 1975).

Also, education shows an impact significantly

different from income (BETA = -0.284, not shown in Tables) although the
two variables are highly correlated (r = 0.600) and act similarly in
micro-level studies.

This difference in impact is due in part to the

fact that income is an aggregate measure in which husbands would be ex
pected to contribute the larger proportion, while education level is an
individual characteristic in which spouses are often similar.

Further

more, the relationship between education and divorce is influenced by
sex and duration of education.

Its complexity as a predictor variable

may account for part of the difference revealed in empirical analysis.
The remaining hypotheses cannot be accepted.

The predictive abil

ity of the other independent variables is not sufficient to suggest a
relationship between them and state divorce rates.

It is noted, how

ever, that the direction of the relationships is as predicted (except
for the variable ONECHILD) even though the strength of the relation
ships suggest little or no impact on the dependent variable.
The discrepancy in the expected and the actual direction for the
proportion of the population having one child at home may be a function
of the length of marriage, a variable not measured in this study.
ples having one child are more likely to be in the early years of

Cou
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marriage which are disproportionately divorce-prone years (see Becker,
1977:1144).

The variable reflecting the presence of any number of chil

dren at home (CHILD18) does reveal the expected relationship with the
divorce score (BETA = -0.221, not shown).
Migration is the strongest predictor of divorce rates (r = 0.750;
BETA = 0.614).

The strong positive relationship between migration and

divorce has been reported and discussed in previous research (Fenelon,
1971; Pang and Hanson, 1968).

It is explained by Fenelon (1971) in terms

of a social cost model similar to the framework used in this paper.

He

notes that system stability, social integration and absence of population
change are all interrelated.

A mobile population is relatively less in

tegrated and therefore less subject to social restraints in general and
the impact of social costs of divorce in particular.

Social barriers

are not strong to begin with in these areas and therefore are less likely
to inhibit divorce decisions.
The reason for this is better understood through a consideration of
the distinction between primitive (mechanical) societies and modern (or
ganic) societies as discussed by Durkheim (1933).

The former are char

acterized by a strongly held collective conscience, little division of
labor, and solidarity through common values.

The latter exhibit indi

viduated consciences, and functional interdependence which forms the
basis for social solidarity.

Thus, individualization increases as mod

ernization of society continues and the scope of social control vis-avis shared values concurrently decreases.

There are more and more items

and events subject to evaluation by the collective conscience at the
same time that there is less consensus on that collective conscience.
The net result is greater latitude for individual behavior in areas
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where the division of l^bor (and thus the organic solidarity) is most
advanced.
A comparison of the multiple regression analysis on the divorce
score and on each of its component variables indicates that basically
the same factors are important in explaining variations in all three
measures (Table 4, page 57; Table 9, page 71; Table 10, page 72).

Edu

cation drops out of the equation for RATECHNG and QRTILE, while MGRATE
is included in QRTILE prediction.

None of these changes are extensive.

The drop in BETA for Catholicism on the rate change variable is ex
pected since the rate is not increasing significantly among Catholics.
Regressing the independent variables on the divorce law index pro
duces a different set of predictor variables (Table 5, page 62).

Age

distribution is the only variable common to all four regression equa
tions.

This suggests that a different set of dynamics are operating on

the law variable than on measures of the divorce rate.
Migration and Catholicism, which together account for almost sixty
percent of the variance explained in the divorce score index (R

=

0.592, not shown), are not present in the divorce law equation.

The

salience of the two variables, and to some extent unemployment, suggest
that social solidarity factors are important in understanding divorce
rates.

Where social barriers against divorce are high, the divorce

rates are low.
The influence of social integration is seen indirectly and to a
lesser extent in the regression on divorce law where industrialization
is a factor.

For historical reasons the northeast section of our coun

try has been the most industrialized.

These states also are generally

characterized by high population stability and high proportions of
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Table 9.

Multiple Regression Analysis on the Divorce Rate Change,
1960-1978

Variable

Zero-Order
Correlation Coefficient
(r)

Standardized
Regression Coefficient
(BETA)

MIGRATN

.584

.613

UNEMPLOY

.328

.212

AGE

-.200

.268

DIVLAWR

-.075

.120

CATHOLIC

-.272

-.138

.298

.048

INCOME

R2 = 0.435
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Table 10.

Multiple Regression Analysis on the 1978 Quartile Ranking by
Divorce Rate

Variable

Zero-Order
Correlation Coefficient
(r)

Standardized
Regression Coefficient
(BETA)

.676

.542

CATHOLIC

-.558

-.332

AGE

-.300

.266

UNEMPLOY

.249

.192

MGRATE

.511

.199

MIGRATN

R2 = 0.627
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Catholic residents.

They tend to have restrictive divorce laws.

In

fact, only one of the breakdown-only states (DIVLAWR = 1) is found in the
northeast or east north central regions.
grounds for divorce.

Most of these states have mixed

The predicted impact on the law index by industri

alization would have been a negative relationship.

This is because of

the increasing interdependence of the major institutions of society as
growth and development continue.

Increasing individualism, and decreas

ing dependence on the family, are generally considered to be associated
with industrialization.

They are also assumed to be related to reduction

in barrier strength of social constraints against divorce.

The positive

BETA in the regression could be a result of collinearity with the MIGRATN
and CATHOLIC variables discussed above.
Marriage rates and the presence of one child at home are two vari
ables with an impact on the divorce law not seen on the divorce rate.
These factors suggest the salience of values of familism.

States with

high scores on these measures have more persons "at risk" in liberaliza
tion of divorce laws.

Married couples and parents have a vested inter

est in ensuring the continuation of marriage and family stability and
the rewards they gain from this stability.

In a separate analysis con

ducted as part of this research an effect of marital status was found on
attitudes toward divorce law.

4

Data gathered by the National Opinion Re

search Center (NORC) as part of its General Social Surveys for the years
1974-1978 indicate that when asked if divorce should be easier or more

^The data discussed are taken from the General Social Surveys (GSS)
Cumulative Codebook (NORC, 1978) and are available on file tape at the
Computer Center of the College of William and Mary. They are responses
from a national sample of English-speaking persons 18 years of age or
older drawn independently each year as described in the codebook. Re
sponses are not available by state but are used here because they
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difficult to obtain than it was at the time of the interview, fortyeight percent of all respondents answered that it should be more diffi
cult (Table 11, page 75).

However, over half of the married and widowed

respondents gave this answer.

The proportion of divorced, separated and

never-married persons expressing this opinion was lower than the average.
Results from the divorce law regression and the NORC data analysis
are mutually supportive if one is willing to assume that public policy
is related to public opinion.

Theoretical and empirical research indi

cates that this is a valid assumption (Luttbeg, 1974).

Legislators in

states having higher proportions of married persons and lower propor
tions of divorced persons would be less likely to support lenient di
vorce laws because of the unfavorable social climate.
While there is some overlap in the dynamics influencing the law in
dex and the rate index, there appears to be a difference in emphasis.
The divorce score index relates more directly to extradyadic factors as
sociated with levels of social integration.

This finding supports the

assumptions in the exchange typology presented in Chapter Three (page 27).
Divorce rates are higher in states where external pressures are lower.
These states have larger proportions of couples located in quadrants II
and III (low stability), with a greater concentration in quadrant III
since the intradyadic tensions accompanying unemployment can contribute
in part to marital dissatisfaction and shift the position toward lower

provide an indication of attitudes throughout the country. Although
some researchers question the validity of public opinion polls, this
writer concurs with Scanzoni (1970:27) that following years of survey
research there is no indication that any sector of the population tends
to falsify information, and that in fact there appears to be "remark
able candor" on even the most sensitive issues. The responses in the
GSS are accepted as a valid reflection of public opinion about divorce
laws.
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quality.

The difference^in dynamics between the divorce rate and the law

variables can be seen in the fact that the divorce law index varies more
with intradyadic factors relating especially to preservation of rewards
of marriage and presence of a family lifestyle.

Graphically, states with

restrictive laws are likely to have more couples located in quadrants I
and II, where marital quality is high, than are states with lenient laws.

Methodological Considerations

The findings and discussion presented in this chapter are based on
macro-level analysis of state divorce rates and laws.

It cannot be con

cluded that the same control variables will be important factors in pre
dicting the likelihood of termination for particular marriages.

Fur

thermore it cannot be implied that divorce law reform does not influence
individual divorce decisions.

The findings here relate to character

istics of states and deal with the environmental aspects of divorce
decisions.
The cross-sectional design eliminated the need for some of the pro
cedures used in previous quasiexperimental and modified time-series de
signs (Mazur-Hart and Berman, 1977; Wright and Stetson, 1978).

For

example it was not necessary to make adjustments, as Wright and Stetson
(1978) did, on reform states* divorce rates based on an averaged measure
of increase in no-reform states.
of variable measurement.

It did introduce discrepancies in time

Scores were obtained on some variables as

early as 1970, while others reflect data from as late as 1978.

However,

the time of measurement for each variable is consistent for all states.
The fact that a diversity of research designs produced the same results
suggests that the finding of no effect of the adoption of no-fault
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divorce laws on increasing divorce rates is not a methodological
artifact.
It might be suspected that the use of the RATECHNG variable in con
struction of the divorce score index biased the results by relying only
on scores at the extremes of the period studied without accounting for
variations in rates within that time frame.

In the early stages of re

search the divorce rates for each state during the eighteen year period
were ploted and the graphs examined for the anticipated J-curves (see
page 33) and for any other patterns or irregularities which might appear.
With very few exceptions the rate patterns were strikingly consistent
within each state and across states.

Beginning approximately in 1965

there has been a steady rise in state divorce rates continuing through
1978.

In Kentucky, Illinois, Alabama and Arizona the' smoothness of this

upward trend was interrupted for a few years early in the series, after
which the overall pattern was in line with the national trend.

Specific

reasons for these irregularities were not known but they appeared to be
unique to these states and they did not provide sufficient reason to
suspect that the rate change variable would mask information relevant to
the purposes of this study.
Furthermore, the graphs failed to reveal the occurrence of short
term effects of the no-fault reforms.

Increases in California have been

attributed to the drop in native Californians "migrating" to Nevada for
a divorce and returning home afterward.

The notoriously high Nevada di

vorce rate did drop following passage of no-fault in California and con
tinues to drop today despite the national trend upward.

As in other

states, however, this trendline was already established prior to the ad
vent of no-fault legislation.

This does suggest, however, that migratory
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divorces and the vitality of divorce "mills" in general may decrease as
divorce becomes more readily available throughout the nation.

Immediate

post-reform changes in other state divorce rates did not represent sub
stantial or sustained changes in the slope of the divorce rate, leading
to the conclusion that short-term effects, where present, are minimal.

CHAPTER SEVEN
IMPLICATIONS

Implications for Future Research

There is substantial evidence to support acceptance of the null hy
pothesis concerning the impact of no-fault divorce on state divorce
rates.

Additional study of this relationship at this time is not likely

to produce different results although it would help clarify some of the
relationships among the dependent and independent variables examined.
Because permissiveness of law is the only law-related factor with a dem
onstrated impact on divorce rates it would be helpful to develop a mea
surement technique for this variable applicable to both fault and nofault legislation.

If available, such a measure would permit an updated

examination of the significance of this relationship.

It is also sug

gested that a measurement technique permitting empirical analysis of
public awareness of divorce legislation might help explain variation in
the impact of legislative reform.

Finally, this research suggests that

it would be fruitful to focus on divorce law policies as a dependent
variable in order to better understand the relationship between divorce
law and divorce rates.

This approach appears to be unexplored in the

empirical literature, although Zuckman (1975:15), Wright and Stetson
(1978:580) and others suggest without further comment the possibility
that laws are a result rather than a cause of increasing divorce rates
and changing family lifestyle.

Additional study in this area is needed
79
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to provide further evidence about the presence of this relationship and
the dynamics involved in it.

Policy Implications

The findings of this study offer additional support for proponents
of no-fault divorce legislation and reassurance to those who oppose it
out of fear that it will magnify the problem of high, ever-increasing
divorce rates.

Whatever other impact it may have on divorce in the var

ious states, no-fault divorce is not likely to influence the divorce rate
of states.

Legislators in states which have not adopted no-fault reform

can benefit from this knowledge as they consider the possibility of fu
ture reform in their respective states.
At the same time all states must be aware of the phenomenon of un
anticipated consequences associated with any legislative reform.

Rose

(1968:35) notes that laws are attempts to deal with social problems;
that they usually transform the problem insome unanticipated
that in the process they often create new social problems,

way; and

A good exam

ple of this is the traditional fault-based divorce laws, which resulted
ultimately in disrespect for the legal process and sham in the court
room.

Many opponents of no-fault laws would suggest that the phenomenon

of divorce on demand is the first indication of an unanticipated trans
formation of the divorce problem, but others would maintain that this
result was both anticipated and accepted at the outset.
lation is still a new concept in divorce law.

No-fault legis

It has not been further

delineated through court interpretation and rulings on definition and
application.

Its impact at the individual

be an important factor.

Attention must be

level is unclear. Time will
given to potential

consequences
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as they become evident before the full impact of the new policies can be
determined.

Proceeding with caution appears to be a reasonable course of

action in view of the historical and empirical evidence.
The view of divorce law as an example of culture lag appears to be a
realistic one.

By the nature of the control function of laws, they lag

behind social change.

Fault-free procedures for the dissolution of mar

riage is an opportunity for the law to catch up with reality.

The new

laws recognize the emergence of a new concept of marriage and the family
for which the traditional fault-based divorce process is inappropriate.
As the new ideas become entrenched, new laws compatible with the new so
cial reality will be required.

This is a necessary and desirable step

if the current attitudes toward marriage and family life prevail.
It is further suggested that the utility' of the new laws goes a step
beyond allowing law to catch up to reality.
ment of society to continue uniformly.

It also permits the develop

From the Durkheimian perspective

it might be said that the traditional divorce laws prevented the expres
sion of individual consciences in modern society by subjecting all indi
viduals to inappropriate societal control.

The new laws do not seek to

punish individuals for offensive marital wrongdoing because divorce is no
longer considered an obvious social evil the way it once was.

No-fault

legislation seeks to regulate the dissolution process rather than in
hibit the dissolution of marriages.

It changes the nature of the law

more toward the restitutive type found in societies characterized by or
ganic solidarity (Durkheim, 1933:111).

Since the components of society

are interdependent, this change toward organic solidarity in the legal
arena enables all society, including the institution of marriage and the
family, to evolve more fully.
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The tendency to re^y on law to solve social problems has been recog
nized.

However, it has been pointed out numerous times (Mowrer, 1924;

Levinger, 1965; Wheeler, 1974; Glendon, 1977) that divorce is the symp
tom, not the disease; the effect, not the cause of marital breakdown.
The actual causes of divorce are outside the domain of the law and are
neither produced by it nor subject to any considerable degree to its
control (Lichtenberger, 1931:208).

If the goal is to control the divorce

problem then it will be necessary to focus attention of the dynamics in
volved in the causes of marital breakdown and ways to intervene in the
process of breakdown before it is complete.

Recognizing the limitations

of the law in its ability to influence divorce helps explain why restric
tive laws have been less effective than one might anticipate.

The im

plication for policy-makers is not to fear relaxation of these laws.
Levinger (1965:28) suggests that increases in barriers (divorce laws in
cluded) is actually the least effective means of making a lasting in
crease in marital cohesiveness because barrier maintenance does not in
crease the internal attractions of marriage.
Public opinion polls, professional journals and popular magazines
all reflect the perceived need for change in divorce procedures.
fault divorce appears to have much to recommend it.

No

Without abandoning

the control function of law and without approving of divorce it provides
a less painful and more realistic mechanism for terminating marriages
which cannot be saved.

Its success in much of the nation is likely to

recommend it to other areas, especially in the absence of workable al
ternative reform measures.
A long-range policy implication can also be made based on the evi
dence presented.

It is possible that uniformity in divorce law may be
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achieved passively a century after active attempts first failed to bring
it about.

The trend toward adoption of no-fault divorce laws, begun in

the 1970s, continues in the early 1980s.

In time all states may at least

include a breakdown provision in their divorce laws.

These statutes are

already quite similar with respect to "grounds” for divorce, recognizing
perceived marital breakdown as sufficient cause.

They differ on divorce-

related issues of child custody and support, property division, et cetera.
However, recent concern and publicity over interstate custody disputes
may rekindle desire for greater uniformity.

Uniformity may never be com

pletely realized, but a fair approximation may result from continuing no
fault reform.

This would be another success story for the National Con

ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, even though the final
form would most likely differ from the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act
first approved in the 1970s.

Implications for Family Stability

Increasing divorce rates have been viewed both historically and
empirically as an indicator of increasing family instability in the in
stitution of marriage and the family.
also associated with the other.

Factors contributing to one were

Because no-fault divorce legislation

has not further increased state divorce rates it is concluded that this
new approach to divorce does not pose a threat to family stability.

As

a mechanism of social control the no-fault laws attempt to maintain the
social order, just as traditional fault-based laws did for so many years.
The difference is that the institutions of marriage and the family have
undergone considerable change since the first laws were enacted.
new laws reflect these changes; the older ones do not.

The
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It must be recognised that marriage and the family are undergoing
social change.

It is not surprising that definitions, attitudes and

controls appropriate to one time period will become inappropriate gener
ations later.

This is particularly true as the pace of social change

continues to accelerate.

Divorce, once an anomaly, is now considered a

necessary adaptive feature of the family in the larger social system.
Bohannon (1979:311) suggests that it is actually a back-up institution
to the family, permitting essential functions to be performed in the
wake of the dissolution of a family unit.

In addition, divorce has been

characterized as a time of regrouping (Bohannon, 1979:310).

This is an

important point because it underscores the fact that only through di
vorce can remarriage be possible.

Persons trapped in unviable marriages

are able to establish new family units when permitted the opportunity to
regroup.

Remarriage rates indicate that, increasingly, formerly married

persons are taking advantage of the opportunity to remarry.

Data reveal

that in 1960 the number of marriages per one thousand divorced or wid
owed brides over thirteen years of age was 32.7.

In 1970 the number was

36.6 and by 1978 it had climbed to 40.0 (Statistical Abstract of the
United States, 1980).
creasingly recognized.

These positive consequences of divorce are in
By easing the restrictions on obtaining divorce

the no-fault laws also ease the transition out of unstable marriages and
into potentially stable relationships.

Family stability as a concept is

not endangered by this transition, although a particular marriage or
family is dissolved in the process.
The net effect of all these changes, suggested by O'Neill (1977:73)
is that divorce has become more a clinical issue than a moral problem.
Glendon discusses this phenomenon in terms of the "dejuridification" of
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marriage and divorce, a process involving a return to forms of social
control other than legal rules concerning the formation, dissolution, and
organization of married life (Glendon, 1977:321).

She believes that re

cent legislative reform implies a shift in the posture of the State with
respect to the family comparable to the shift which occurred when the
State first assumed jurisdiction from ecclesiastical authorities.

She

argues that the State is actually more heavily involved in family matters
than ever, but in a different way.

Now government agencies are espe

cially involved with the economic consequences of dissolution and with
the welfare of children from both legal and ^e facto families (Glendon,
1977:324).

The viewpoint expressed by O'Neill, Glendon, and others sug

gests that the process of increasing functional interdependence and in
creasing latitude for the individual conscience continues today.
This discussion is not meant to imply that divorce is now a so
cially acceptable phenomenon which causes no qualms for modern society.
There is still opposition to legal reform and to total social acceptance
of divorce and divorced persons.
lustrates this.

The compromise nature of our law il

Even with respect to the no-fault legislation there has

been compromise, with many states choosing an "add-on" approach to the
reform.

We have not "solved" the problem of divorce, but we have rede

fined it and deal with it from a different perspective.

Consequently

the atmosphere is generally more conducive to more liberal laws.
The fact that remarriage rates are relatively high and increasing
suggests that the increase in divorce rates has not damaged the viabil
ity of marriage and the family.
past.

Both are highly valued today, as in the

However, Scanzoni (1968) suggests the existence of a paradox in

the values of many persons today.

In a comparison of ongoing marriages
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and dissolved marriages jae found that participants from both groups held
values of permanence and pragmatism in marriage, and they held these
values simultaneously.

In this study and in others this fact must be

remembered in drawing implications.

It is neither safe nor fair to as

sume that high divorce rates indicate a wholesale rejection of family
lifestyle and lifelong marriage ideals.

It does suggest that increas

ingly people are finding it necessary to take the pragmatic view of mar
riage and justify divorce behavior on the basis of personal needs and
satisfactions.

Identification of this paradox provides further proof

that family stability remains an ideal even as the concepts of marriage
and the family evolve.
The significance for the individual of the no-fault concept is
great.

The societal impact is not destructive of family stability.

This was the intention of the reformers.

APPENDIX A

LIST OF STATES BY DIVORCE LAW CATEGORY,

I.

No-Fault Only
California
Iowa
Florida
Oregon
Colorado
Michigan

II.

1978

Kentucky
Nebraska
Nevada*
Washington
Arizona

Missouri
Minnesota
Delaware
Montana
Wyoming

Connecticut
Georgia
Maine
Massachusetts
Rhode Island

Mississippi
Tennessee
West Virginia
Indiana*

Mixed
Breakdown plus Fault
Texas
Alabama
Idaho
New Hampshire
North Dakota

Separation < 1 year plus Fault
North Carolina
New York

III.

Wisconsin
Maryland

Vermont
Virginia

Fault Only
Separation > 1 year plus Fault
Utah
South Carolina

New Jersey
Ohio

Louisiana*
Arkansas*

Incompatibility plus Fault
Alaska
Oklahoma

Kansas

New Mexico*

Pennsylvania**

South Dakota

Fault Only
Illinois

*Not included in empirical analysis.
**Added breakdown to existing grounds effective July 1980.
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APPENDIX B

SECONDARY SOURCES USED IN DATA COLLECTION

Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1979:
INCOME
EDUCATN
MIGRATN
AGE

RACE (derived)
ETHNIC
WOMLABOR
UNEMPLOY

1970 Census of the Population:
URBAN
CHILD18

ONECHILD
GE4CHILD

County and City Data Book, 1977:
INDUST

1980 Catholic Almanac:
CATHOLIC

Monthly Vital Statistics Report/Advance Report— Einal Divorce Statis
tics, 1978:
DIV0RCE2

Monthly Vital Statistics Report/Advance Report— Final Marriage Statis
tics , 1978:
MGRATE

Vital Statistics of the United States, 1970:
DIVORCE1

Hamilton, Harper.

The No-Fault Divorce Guide:

NUMGRNDS (derived)

DIVLAW (derived)
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